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MASS MONITORING
AVLANA K. EISENBERG*
ABSTRACT
Business is booming for criminal justice monitoring technology: these
days “ankle bracelet” refers as often to an electronic monitor as to
jewelry. Indeed, the explosive growth of electronic monitoring (“EM”) for
criminal justice purposes—a phenomenon which this Article terms “mass
monitoring”—is among the most overlooked features of the otherwise wellknown phenomenon of mass incarceration.
This Article addresses the fundamental question of whether EM is
punishment. It finds that the origins and history of EM as a progressive
alternative to incarceration—a punitive sanction—support characterization
of EM as punitive, and that EM comports with the goals of dominant
punishment theories. Yet new uses of EM have complicated this narrative.
The Article draws attention to the expansion of EM both as a substitute for
incarceration and as an added sanction, highlighting the analytic
importance of what it terms the “substitution/addition distinction.” The
Article argues that, as a punitive sanction, EM can be justified when used
as a substitute for incarceration, but that its use as an added sanction may
result in excessive punishment and raises significant constitutional and
policy concerns.
The Article’s findings have crucial implications for hotly contested
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questions over whether monitoring can be imposed retroactively and
whether pretrial house arrest plus monitoring (which resembles the postconviction use of monitoring as a substitute for incarceration) should count
toward time served. The Article provides a framework for addressing these
questions and, at the same time, offers practical policy guidance that will
enable courts and policymakers to ensure that EM programs are genuinely
a cost-saving, progressive substitute for incarceration rather than another
destructive expansion of government control.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, electronic monitoring (“EM”) of those convicted or
suspected of crimes has become so ubiquitous in American society that the
term “ankle bracelet,” 1 which once designated a fashion accessory, now
frequently refers to a judicially imposed electronic monitor.2 EM use in the
United States expanded from fewer than one hundred people in 1984 to
more than 200,000 by 2009, 3 and every state has enacted legislation
enabling the use of EM for criminal justice purposes.4 In California, some
offenders serve their entire sentences in their communities, wearing Global
Positioning System (“GPS”) ankle bracelets 24/7. 5 In Rhode Island,
eligible offenders may opt to serve their sentences in a Community
Confinement program where they are subject to home confinement plus
radio frequency monitoring. 6 In Florida, EM routinely is imposed as a
condition of pretrial release, sometimes instead of, and often in addition to,
bail. 7 Wisconsin is one of twelve states where offenders who have
completed their sentences may be subject to lifetime monitoring.8
1. The terms “ankle bracelet,” “ankle monitor,” “electronic monitor,” and “tag” have been used
interchangeably in the criminal justice context. See, e.g., Mike Nellis, Surveillance, Stigma and Spatial
Constraint The Ethical Challenges of Electronic Monitoring, in ELECTRONICALLY MONITORED
PUNISHMENT 193, 203–05 (Mike Nellis et al. eds., 2013).
2. In the United States alone, more than 200,000 people are subject to electronic monitoring
(“EM”). James Kilgore, Electronic Monitoring Some Causes for Concern, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Mar.
15, 2012), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2012/mar/15/electronic-monitoring-some-causes-forconcern. The global market is “projected to be in excess of $6 billion by 2018.” SuperCom Ltd,
SuperCom Introduces Enhanced PureSecurity™ Electronic Monitoring Suite, PR NEWSWIRE (July 9,
2014),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/supercom-introduces-enhanced-puresecurityelectronic-monitoring-suite-266404871.html.
3. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFENDER SUPERVISION WITH
ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY: COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS RESOURCE 17 tbls.1a & 1b (2d ed. 2009),
https://www.appa-net.org/eweb/docs/APPA/pubs/OSET_2.pdf; Mark E. Burns, Electronic Home
Detention New Sentencing Alternative Demands Uniform Standards, 18 J. CONTEMP. L. 75, 82 (1992).
4. Deeanna M. Button et al., Using Electronic Monitoring to Supervise Sex Offenders
Legislative Patterns and Implications for Community Corrections Officers, 20 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV.
414, 423–24 (2009).
5. BRANDON MARTIN & RYKEN GRATTET, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., ALTERNATIVES TO
INCARCERATION IN CALIFORNIA 1 (Apr. 2015), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_415B
MR.pdf.
6. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF R.I., COMMUNITY CONFINEMENT 8,
http://www.doc.ri.gov/rehabilitative/community/Community%20Confinement%20Info%20Booklet.doc
(last visited Jan. 6, 2017).
7. See, e.g., Supervised Pretrial Release, LEON COUNTY, https://cms.leoncountyfl.gov/Home/
Departments/Office-of-Intervention-and-Detention-Alternatives/Supervised-Pretrial-Release (last
visited Jan. 6, 2017).
8. These states include California, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3004(b) (West
2016); FLA. STAT. § 948.012(4) (2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-14(e) (2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-
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Despite the scholarly focus on mass incarceration,9 this explosion of
EM remains relatively unstudied. This Article fills that gap, identifying and
analyzing this phenomenon, which it terms “mass monitoring.” The Article
addresses the question central to future uses of EM in the criminal justice
context: How should EM be characterized according to U.S. law? This
question is especially timely, as bipartisan commitment to reducing the
prison population has created newfound interest in alternatives to
imprisonment generally,10 and in EM technology in particular.11
The existing accounts of EM are incomplete. A rich criminological
literature offers insights into the sociological effects of EM use but does
not address the significant legal implications of mass monitoring.12 Where
EM is mentioned in the legal literature, it is either reduced to merely one of
its many uses or included as part of a larger phenomenon. For example,
some accounts deal only with one aspect of EM use at a particular stage of

3717(u) (2016); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.3(A)(3) (2016); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11723(d)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520n (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.735(4)
(2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.40 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 137.700, 144.103 (2016); 11 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-37-8.2.1 (2016); WIS. STAT. § 301.48 (2016).
9. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (arguing that mass incarceration of African Americans creates a
modern caste system comparable to Jim Crow segregation); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND
THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2006) (discussing the
development of four key movements that shaped the structure of the “carceral” state); IMPRISONING
AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION (Mary Pattillo et al. eds., 2004) (collecting
analyses of the impact of mass incarceration on family, community, and economic life); MARC MAUER,
RACE TO INCARCERATE (2006) (discussing the evolution of incarceration in the United States over the
past two hundred years); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011)
(arguing that America’s criminal justice system has unraveled and exploring solutions for repair); James
Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21
(2012) (disputing the analogy of Jim Crow to mass incarceration).
10. See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, The Political Climate Change Surrounding Alternatives to
Incarceration, 38 HUM. RTS. 6, 6 (2011).
11. See, e.g., More Electronic Monitoring Could Relieve Prison Overcrowding, Prison Officials
Say, ARK. NEWS (Sept. 2, 2013, 1:09 AM), http://arkansasnews.com/sections/news/arkansas/moreelectronic-monitoring-could-relieve-prison-overcrowding-prison-officials; Erika Slife, More NonViolent Offenders Getting Home Monitoring in Cook County, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 5, 2011),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-10-05/news/chi-more-nonviolent-offenders-getting-homemonitoring-in-cook-county-20111005_1_home-monitoring-house-arrest-defendants.
12. See, e.g., WILLIAM BALES ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE
ASSESSMENT OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING 127 (2010); Richard Jones, The Electronic Monitoring of
Offenders Penal Moderation or Penal Excess?, 62 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 475, 477 (2014); J.
Robert Lilly & Mike Nellis, The Limits of Techno-Utopianism Electronic Monitoring in the United
States of America, in ELECTRONICALLY MONITORED PUNISHMENT, supra note 1, at 21–22; Jamie S.
Martin et al., Offenders’ Perceptions of House Arrest and Electronic Monitoring, 48 J. OFFENDER
REHABILITATION 547, 547–67 (2009).
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the criminal justice process, such as pretrial EM.13 But such a narrow focus
does not lend itself to assessing the breadth and diversity of EM use
throughout the criminal justice process.
Other accounts are limited because they address EM in an abstract,
general way, precluding questions about the legitimacy of specific uses of
EM. For instance, scholars have discussed EM as one of many examples in
the broad contexts of the ethics of mass surveillance, 14 crime prevention
through technology,15 and the collateral consequences of punishment.16 But
by situating EM among other burgeoning technologies used by the criminal
justice system or within the broad category of obstacles individuals face
after completion of their sentences, the particular features, strengths, and
limitations of EM are obscured.17
This Article is the first sustained examination of mass monitoring and
its place in the criminal justice landscape. It argues that EM as currently

13. See, e.g., Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE
L.J. 1344, 1382–96 (2014) (proposing a “right to be monitored” in the pretrial context).
14. See generally, e.g., SURVEILLANCE: POWER, PROBLEMS, AND POLITICS (Sean P. Hier & Josh
Greenberg eds., 2009); Gary Marx, Ethics for the New Surveillance, 14 INFO. SOC’Y 171 (1998).
15. See, e.g., Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1328–40, 1394–400
(2008) (linking various technologies, including DNA databasing, electronic indexing, biometric
scanning, and EM, to the rise of preventative detention and the regulatory state, and concluding that all
of these technologies should be subject to increased constitutional scrutiny).
16. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1816–21 (2012); Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences
and the Preventive State, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 301, 306–17 (2015).
17. This tendency to generalize is most visible in three separate, though related, approaches to
criticizing the use of EM. One approach invokes the historical association between EM (especially
eavesdropping) and totalitarianism. Putting aside constitutional doctrine, this approach counsels that the
use (let alone expansion) of EM is dangerous, repressive, and antidemocratic. See, e.g., Julie M. Houk,
Electronic Monitoring of Probationers A Step Toward Big Brother?, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 431,
431–32 (1984). By invoking this visceral, negative association, this approach essentially cuts off
consideration of a legitimate role for EM in the criminal justice system. A second approach counsels
that EM should not be used because to be subject to monitoring technology as a punitive sanction is
inherently distasteful, even inhumane. See generally, e.g., Richard Jones, The Electronic Monitoring of
Offenders Penal Moderation or Penal Excess?, 62 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 475 (2014). This
approach in effect smuggles in an Eighth Amendment “cruel and unusual” punishment analysis.
However, in today’s world of lengthy sentences and often horrendous prison conditions, the general
proposition that monitoring is more objectionable than incarceration seems unconvincing. The third and
most well-articulated approach invokes the specter of “net widening,” a broad, generally amorphous
concern about government encroachment on civil liberties. See generally, e.g., JAMES KILGORE, CTR.
FOR MEDIA JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC MONITORING IS NOT THE ANSWER: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON A
FLAWED ALTERNATIVE 12 (Oct. 2015), http://centerformediajustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/
EM-Report-Kilgore-final-draft-10-4-15.pdf. This approach to understanding EM, arguably a modern
version of the antitotalitarianism approach, is unproductive because it puts EM in a heterogeneous
category and assumes that net widening is inherently bad, thus obscuring the possibility that EM could
also be a legitimate form of punishment.
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practiced in the United States is a punitive sanction and, further, that EM is
a justifiable form of punishment for sufficiently serious crimes.18 Crucially,
once EM is understood to be a punitive sanction, questions about whether
the imposition of EM in a particular instance is consistent with
constitutional dictates or sound policy must take into account what this
Article terms the “substitution/addition distinction,” whether EM is being
used as a substitute for incarceration or as an added sanction.
The Article thus challenges courts and policymakers that have deemed
EM to be “merely regulatory.” For example, in 2016, writing for the
Seventh Circuit in Belleau v. Wall, Judge Posner referred to a Wisconsin
law imposing lifetime EM on citizens who had completed their sentences
as “not punishment; it is prevention.”19 Relying on this classification of the
EM sanction as non-punitive, the Seventh Circuit ruled that retroactive
application of the Wisconsin law did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, which forbids retroactive punishment. 20 This
Article highlights the inconsistency and illogic of legislative and judicial
decisions that, on the one hand, provide for the use of EM as a substitute
for incarceration (thus suggesting that EM is punitive), while, on the other
hand, impose or condone the use of EM as “non-punitive.”
The Article invokes history, sociology, and normative theory to
support the argument that EM functions as a punitive sanction: EM has
been and currently is imposed as a consequence of involvement in the
criminal justice system, EM is experienced by those subject to it as
punishment, and the use of EM as a punitive sanction accords with
traditional theories of punishment.21 Accordingly, the Article argues, EM
should be analyzed as a form of punishment. Importantly, this Article’s
18. The Article exposes and challenges widespread misconceptions that manifest as criticisms of
EM from both ends of the political spectrum. One criticism of EM use—most commonly identified with
the political left—is that EM is closely associated with totalitarian symbolism and assumed to be a
violation of civil liberties. Another criticism of EM use—most widely identified with the political
right—is that EM is not punitive, but rather merely regulation. This Article challenges both of these
perspectives. It attacks the characterization of EM as non-punitive while also suggesting that EM could
play a progressive role in criminal justice reform if deployed in a limited, non-additive manner.
19. Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2016).
20. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10; Cal. Dep’t of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995).
21. This Article’s inquiry into the character of EM resembles the Supreme Court’s inquiry into
history, sociology, and normative theory when called to determine whether the imposition of a law is
“punitive in effect” for purposes of a retroactivity analysis under the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court
applies the multi-factor test outlined in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), asking
whether the sanction at issue “has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; imposes
an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational
connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose.” Smith v. Doe, 538
U.S. 84, 97 (2003).
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claim is not that one could never imagine a use of EM technology that is
non-punitive, 22 but rather that, as EM is currently used in the criminal
justice context, it is punitive.23
EM’s origins and the history of its use as a substitute for incarceration
support its characterization as a punitive sanction. EM technology was
initially conceived in the 1960s as a progressive alternative to
imprisonment. 24 By the 1980s, radio frequency monitoring technology
became commercially available and was used in conjunction with house
arrest to alleviate dire prison overcrowding.25 This criminal justice use of
the new EM technology skyrocketed in the late 1980s,26 and thus the mass
monitoring phenomenon was born.
The original conception and use of EM as a substitute for
incarceration fits squarely within the parameters of punishment theory and
is consistent with punitive goals, including retribution, expression of
condemnation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.27 A retributivist, for example,
could endorse EM as an alternative to incarceration if the harm visited
upon offenders, including loss of liberty and privacy, is harm that the
offender deserves to suffer. 28 The use of EM could also satisfy the
expressivist, at least to the extent that monitoring devices are visible and
limit the mobility of offenders, so that these devices are understood by
other members of the community to signify wrongdoers being held
accountable for their wrongs.29
22. Whether one would ever want to use EM for non-punitive purposes is a legislative,
normative question that is beyond the scope of this inquiry.
23. Importantly, for EM not to be presumptively construed as punishment, monitoring programs
would need to be conceptualized (and devices would need to be constructed) differently. This Article
does not recommend such an expansion to the use of EM in civil contexts, but by way of illustration, if
EM were used widely in non-criminal contexts, the social meaning of EM as punitive would necessarily
evolve. Or, imagine if instead of bulky EM devices, monitoring programs utilized embedded chips.
While many might object to a world where embedded chips were widely used in the civil context as
nightmarish, crucially, their rationale would not be connected to punishment. Indeed, the existing
concern of over-punishing would be transformed to a new, different problem—that of the
technophobes’ nightmare—namely, the expanding influence of technology in modern life. This thought
experiment highlights the importance of assessing the social meaning of a phenomenon—in this case,
EM—as it is currently practiced.
24. See infra Part I.A.1.
25. See infra Part I.A.2.
26. Id.
27. See infra Part I.B. The persuasiveness of the punitive justification, however, will vary
depending upon whether EM functions as an alternative to incarceration or as an additional punishment
beyond incarceration. See infra Part II.B.
28. See infra Part I.B.1.
29. See infra Part I.B.2. Furthermore, when used as an alternative to a criminal sentence, the
strongest message-sending aspect—the criminal conviction itself—remains constant, regardless of
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The deterrence theorist will care about whether EM is sufficiently
undesirable to discourage potential criminal conduct.30 Firsthand accounts
suggest that the loss of liberty, privacy, and autonomy is hugely significant
to those subject to EM; in some cases, EM is experienced as scarcely less
drastic than incarceration.31 EM also may contribute to deterrence simply
because persons subject to EM are more easily apprehended, thus reducing
enforcement gaps. Finally, rehabilitative principles support the use of EM,
in conjunction with other programs, instead of incarceration.32 While EM is
not inherently rehabilitative, preliminary studies of the use of EM as part of
a more holistic reentry program, or as a means by which to preserve family
connections, employment, and other social connections that would be lost
if the offender were incarcerated, suggest that, as one element of a larger
program, EM can serve rehabilitative ends.33
By the late 1990s, a new monitoring technology entered the
corrections scene that would both expand and complicate EM’s role as a
burgeoning alternative to incarceration. GPS technology promised a new
level of precision—the ability to monitor an individual’s location 24/7,
whether inside or outside the home—giving rise to a broadening of EM
uses and new populations subject to EM.34 With the introduction of GPS
technology, two discrete strands of EM use emerged: as a substitute for
incarceration and as an added condition to a preexisting punishment.35
Distinguishing between these two strands of EM use—which this
Article terms the “substitution/addition distinction”—helps to reconcile
conflicting rhetoric about EM. 36 Supporters of EM who focus on costeffectiveness and social benefits of EM tend to assume that EM is used as a
substitute for incarceration, while opponents of EM focus on the dangerous
whether the offender is monitored or incarcerated. While a sentence to prison arguably sends a stronger
message, on the other hand, while in prison, everyone with whom the offender comes into contact is
either also incarcerated or part of the criminal justice machinery. By contrast, when subject to EM, the
offender is perhaps more persistently aware of the differences between the life of someone subject to
criminal sanction and the lives of those who are not.
30. See infra Part I.B.3.
31. See, e.g., Peter B. Wood & Harold G. Grasmick, Toward the Development of Punishment
Equivalencies Male and Female Inmates Rate the Severity of Alternative Sanctions Compared to
Prison, 16 JUST. Q. 19, 19 (1999).
32. See infra Part I.B.4.
33. Brian K. Payne & Randy R. Gainey, The Electronic Monitoring of Offenders Released from
Jail or Prison Safety, Control, and Comparisons to the Incarceration Experience, 84 PRISON J. 413,
416 (2004).
34. See infra Part II.A. While the use of GPS technology expanded the populations subject to
EM—most notably, sex offenders—it did not fundamentally change the punitive nature of EM.
35. See infra Part II.B.
36. See infra Part II.C.
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expansion of state control, assuming that EM is used as an added
condition.37
The substitution/addition distinction is also crucial to constitutional
analysis and policy assessments of EM use in the criminal justice context.
Since, as this Article maintains, government-imposed EM should be
presumed to be punishment, whether a particular use of EM is
constitutional and justifiable on policy grounds depends on whether it is
being used as a substitute for incarceration or as an added condition.38
Retroactive imposition of punishment is unconstitutional, and courts
should find retroactive imposition of EM—a clear use of EM as an added
condition—in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.39 In the pretrial context, individuals subject to EM coupled
with house arrest—a sanction which, in the post-sentence context, may be a
substitute for incarceration—should receive credit for time served.40
The substitution/addition distinction also should be central to any
policy analysis of EM use. Precisely because EM is best understood as
serving a punitive function in the criminal justice context, policymakers
should take steps to avoid EM creep—the unfettered expansion of criminal
justice surveillance. Following the widespread assumption that U.S.
sentencing is too punitive, EM should be favored in some instances as an
alternative to incarceration, but it should be presumptively disfavored as an
added condition. Even when used as a substitute for incarceration,
safeguards should be introduced to avoid the financially motivated
expansion of EM, and efforts by private companies to further expand EM
should be resisted. 41 Finally, metrics should be put in place to evaluate
which approaches are most successful for which offender populations.
Only then will policymakers be able to make empirically informed choices
about the future uses of EM.42
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the origins and
traditional use of criminal justice EM as a substitute for incarceration—a
punitive sanction—and finds that this use can be justified by the dominant
punishment theories. Part II highlights the bifurcation of mass monitoring
that accompanied the introduction of GPS technology and distinguishes

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See infra Part II.D.
See infra Part II.E.
See infra Part III.A.1.
See infra Part III.A.2.
See infra Part III.B.1.
See infra Part III.B.2.
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between its uses as a substitute for incarceration and as an added sanction.
It highlights the primacy of this “substitution/addition distinction,” which is
crucial to clarifying polarized discourse around EM and has significant
implications for punishment theory, since an added punitive sanction to an
existing proportionate punishment would result in excessive punishment.
Part III explores the implications of these findings for the future uses of
EM, doctrinally in the context of allegedly non-punitive uses in the postsentence and pretrial stages, and practically with respect to financing EM,
measuring results, and preventing the unfettered expansion of this
technology.
I. THE HISTORY OF MASS MONITORING AS PUNISHMENT
This Part introduces the mass monitoring phenomenon and anchors
the Article’s discussion of EM as a punitive sanction. It first traces the use
of EM, from early experiments with parolees through the explosion of its
use in conjunction with house arrest as an alternative to incarceration. It
then demonstrates that criminal justice use of EM is consistent with the
goals of dominant punishment theories.
A. THE PROMISE OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR
INCARCERATION
1. Early Experiments and Founding Principles
The use of EM for offenders was originally conceived as a progressive
alternative to incarceration—even as a way to phase out the nation’s
prisons and jails.43 In 1964, a group of Harvard researchers pioneered EM
technology for criminal justice use.44 Using equipment measuring “6 inches
by 3 inches by 1 inch in size” and “weigh[ing] about two pounds,” this new
technology was used to monitor parolees in Boston and Cambridge. 45
Participants in the experiment wore the technology on a belt and were
required to remain within a designated monitoring area approximately
1,000 feet from a repeater station. 46 When a participant’s transceiver
43. See, e.g., Ralph Kirkland Gable, Application of Personal Telemonitoring to Current
Problems in Corrections, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 167, 172–73 (1986).
44. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 13, 19. The
literature refers to these researchers alternately as the Schwitzgebel brothers and, after they changed
their last names, the Gable brothers.
45. Gable, supra note 43, at 168. See also ANN H. CROWE ET AL., OFFENDER SUPERVISION WITH
ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY 2 (2002). Other experimental groups included mentally ill patients and
research volunteers. Id.
46. Gable, supra note 43, at 168. Accord MATT BLACK & RUSSELL G. SMITH, ELECTRONIC
MONITORING IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (Austl. Inst. of Criminology, Trends & Issues in
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activated the repeater station, the participant’s location would be recorded
and displayed.47
The researchers involved in these early experiments had high hopes
for future use of EM in the criminal context, specifically its use as a
favorable alternative to incarceration.48 They maintained, “[w]hen specific
offending behaviors can be accurately predicted and/or controlled within
the offender’s own environment, incarceration will no longer be necessary
as a means of controlling behavior and protecting society.”49
2. The Growth of Radio Frequency Monitoring
By the early 1980s, commercial EM equipment was available.
Manufacturers pitched this new radio frequency technology as an effective
complement to house arrest. 50 Given the severe prison overcrowding
problems at the time, 51 states took note, and the mass monitoring
phenomenon was born. 52 From 1986 to 1989, use of this burgeoning
technology exploded, and the number of offenders subject to EM and house
arrest grew by 6,700 percent. 53 Sanctions that combined EM and house
arrest were widely considered cheap, humane, and safe alternatives to

Crime and Criminal Justice No. 254, 2003), http://aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/
tandi254.pdf (explaining active systems of EM).
47. Gable, supra note 43, at 168.
48. Robert Gable, Electronic Monitoring, ROBERT GABLE, https://rgable.wordpress.com/
electronic-monitoring-of-criminal-offenders (last visited Jan. 6, 2017). Notably, contemporaneous
accounts, while enthusiastic, were not without some hint of concern for unchecked surveillance. See
generally, e.g., Robert L. Schwitzgebel, A Belt from Big Brother, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Apr. 1969, at 45,
45 (describing early EM experiments and potential future uses of the technology). Gable claimed that
the ominous title of his article was not his choice. Gable, supra.
49. Ralph Schwitzgebel et al., A Program of Research in Behavioral Electronics, 9 BEHAV. SCI.
233, 237 (1964).
50. James Bonta et al., Can Electronic Monitoring Make a Difference? An Evaluation of Three
Canadian Programs, 46 CRIME & DELINQ. 61, 62 (1992).
51. See, e.g., Rod Smolla, Prison Overcrowding and the Courts A Roadmap for the 1980s, 1984
U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 402–03 (1984) (detailing some negative effects of overcrowding).
52. Many have traced the commercial proliferation of EM to collaboration between Schwitzgebel
and a district court judge from New Mexico who, in the late 1970s, was inspired by a Spider-Man
comic book to imagine “a device which monitored a person’s proximity to a base station, relaying any
violations via telephone.” Lilly & Nellis, supra note 12, at 24–25. This technology was already used for
non-criminal justice purposes; for example, Sears catalog stores used radio frequency technology to
alert customers that their orders were ready. Peggy Conway, Survey of Agencies Using Electronic
Monitoring Reveals a Promising Future, J. OFFENDER MONITORING, Summer/Fall 2003, at 5, 5.
53. See GAIL A. CAPUTO, INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS IN CORRECTIONS 99 (2004) (reporting the
increase from 95 individuals in 1986 to 6,490 in 1989). The first EM house arrest program involved ten
male offenders in New Mexico, and within the year, counties in Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, and
Michigan followed suit. Rolando V. del Carmen & Joseph B. Vaughn, Legal Issues in the Use of
Electronic Surveillance in Probation, FED. PROB., June 1986, at 60, 60.
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prison that nevertheless delivered some deserved punishment.54
In 1987, the Florida Department of Corrections pioneered a program
that used EM with house arrest as an alternative to incarceration. 55 The
radio frequency unit enabled officers to keep track of whether the
individual on house arrest remained at home. According to the profile of
this program, “[t]he equipment consists of a tamper-resistant small
transmitter worn by the offender. The transmitter communicates with a
small receiving unit tied into the phone landline. The receiving unit notifies
a monitoring station if the signal is lost; if so, the probation officer is
notified.”56 The radio frequency system “can be programmed to take work
or religious schedules into account allowing offenders to be off-site at
predetermined times. Officers can also use a ‘drive by’ monitoring device
to verify the location of the offender, whether at home, at work, or in
treatment as scheduled.”57
Some of these radio frequency EM programs have remained virtually
unchanged through the present day. For example, since 1989, Rhode Island
has offered eligible offenders58 the opportunity to opt into the Community
Confinement program,59 which consists of house arrest and radio frequency
monitoring, instead of going to prison or jail. 60 Qualifications include a
legal residence and a landline, and a screening interview is required for
each offender.61
While in Community Confinement, offenders are expected to spend
the vast majority of their time at home, though they are allowed to
participate in “life-sustaining activities,” which include laundry and
54. See, e.g., Marc Renzema & David Skelton, Scope of Electronic Monitoring Today, J.
OFFENDER MONITORING, Fall 1991, at 6, 7.
55. Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Program Profile
Electronic Monitoring (Florida),
CRIMESOLUTIONS.GOV (Apr. 24, 2012), www.crimesolutions.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?ID=230.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. If the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney agree, the Department of Corrections will
schedule an eligibility hearing. Interview with Anne D’Alessio, Home Confinement Dir., R.I. Dep’t of
Corrections, in Cranston, R.I. (July 9, 2015). Ultimately, the judge determines whether the offender can
join the Community Confinement program. Id.
59. Maryland is the only other state that offers an opt-in community confinement program for the
entire duration of a qualified offender’s sentence. Offenders are excluded if they were charged with a
violent crime in the previous five years, as well as if the current charge is intent to deliver illegal drugs
(though drug possession does not exclude an offender from consideration for the program). Use of
firearms is also an exclusionary factor. Id.
60. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF R.I., supra note 6, at 3–4.
61. If the offender will be living with someone, there is a separate interview required of that
person. Interview with Anne D’Alessio, supra note 58. No offender is allowed to live with someone on
active probation unless that person is a family member. Id.
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grocery shopping.62 Participants in Community Confinement meet weekly
or biweekly with their community counselors, each of whom supervises
approximately fifty offenders; the offender brings a proposed schedule for
the coming week, and the counselor approves or denies the proposed
activities and also collects program fees.63 Once approved by the counselor,
the written schedules provided by offenders are data entered into a
Department of Corrections computer.64
The program is overseen from the Community Confinement office at
the Department of Corrections, which is centralized in Cranston, and two
corrections officers are on call for each shift. 65 During their shift, the
officers sit in front of a computer watching for alerts. 66 There are also
random “community field visits,” often assisted by “drive-by” machines to
detect radio frequency, ensuring that offenders are where they said they
would be.67 If the offender is not where the offender is supposed to be, or if
the band of the offender’s monitor has been tampered with, an alert will be
activated in the Community Confinement program headquarters. 68 An
offender who has been missing for thirty minutes or more is considered on
“escape status.”69 In the case of an alert, once the situation is resolved, the
on-duty corrections officer consults with the Community Confinement
program supervisor about the appropriate sanction.70
This Rhode Island example illustrates key features of radio frequency
EM programs: monitoring technology is administered by criminal justice
officials as a more humane alternative to prison and as a means to reduce
prison overcrowding. The following Section scrutinizes this use of EM
through the lens of punishment theory, finding that the use of EM as an
alternative to incarceration comports with traditional goals of punishment.

62. Id.
63. Random drug and alcohol testing is also administered during these visits. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The size of Rhode Island and the centralization of its Department of Corrections—a
single campus that houses everyone from maximum security inmates to the Community Confinement
headquarters for the state—is unique, and the Community Confinement program benefits from these
features. For example, this concentration of resources makes it logistically feasible for inmates to check
in with their counselor each week. Larger states wishing to adopt this model could create multiple
Community Confinement branches across the state.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Sanctions could range from the entry of a case management note to a warning to
incarceration. Id. However, only the Director and Associate Director of the Community Confinement
program are empowered to incarcerate an offender who has violated the conditions of the program. Id.
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B. ELECTRONIC MONITORING AS PUNISHMENT
Both retributive and consequentialist analyses raise questions about
how EM compares to other sanctions, particularly incarceration. While
each person’s experience of EM (like incarceration) is unique, 71 as a
general principle, EM should be considered less restrictive than
incarceration. 72 But this fact alone does not cut against its punitiveness.
Especially given the surge of interest in alternatives to incarceration, it
simply cannot be the case that anything less restrictive than incarceration is
insufficiently punitive, for such argument would preclude the very
possibility of alternatives to incarceration.
If one imagines broad levels of restrictiveness, the highest level, Level
4, is incarceration. 73 The next level, Level 3, is home confinement with
EM, which restricts one’s mobility but is widely believed to be less
punitive than imprisonment. 74 The next level, Level 2, is home
confinement without EM, which is obviously less restrictive as the offender
is not required to wear a monitor, which many have reported to be
physically painful; 75 even if the offender is subject to restrictions on
mobility, the offender’s moment-to-moment whereabouts are not subject to
criminal justice oversight.76 The final level, Level 1, is EM alone without
home confinement.77

71. See, e.g., Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
182, 196 (2009).
72. See, e.g., Martin et al., supra note 12, at 567.
73. Of course, there are huge distinctions in levels of restrictiveness within many prisons, but that
discussion is beyond this Article’s scope.
74. Some offenders, however, find EM and home confinement worse than prison. Martin et al.,
supra note 12, at 563 (reporting that, of 61 surveyed offenders from Western Pennsylvania, “28% of the
respondents stated that they would prefer a jail sentence to [house arrest] and EM—for these
respondents, [house arrest] was viewed as being less palatable than serving time in the local jail”).
However, the Rhode Island experience, where every eligible offender has opted into the Community
Confinement program, suggests that these are outliers. Perhaps this is a function of expectation bias—
people may assume that EM and home confinement will not feel especially restrictive, and when they
experience otherwise, they become particularly malcontented.
75. See, e.g., Problems Plague GPS Tracking of WA Offenders, KING5.COM (Feb. 26, 2014,
8:17 PM), http://www.king5.com/story/news/local/investigations/2014/08/05/13398446.
76. How much the punitive effect of monitoring is related to the physical device attached to
one’s body versus the knowledge that one’s every movement can be recorded is a question for future
research.
77. Some may argue that Level 1 is actually more restrictive than Level 2. This determination
may vary depending on how one assesses the value of physical mobility versus that of not having one’s
whereabouts under scrutiny. Regardless, this Article’s analysis does not hinge on the difference
between Level 1 and Level 2. Rather, a crucial distinction is between Level 2 and Level 3. Since EM is
experienced as restrictive and painful, there should be little doubt that the addition of EM to a
punishment will make it more restrictive, and, thus, that Level 3 is more restrictive than Level 2. As for
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The experience of those subject to EM and the broader social meaning
of EM are deeply relevant to the question whether EM comports with
punishment theory.78 This Section draws on qualitative data revealing that
EM causes pain and unpleasantness, and may negatively affect a wearer’s
employment prospects, family relationships, and general wellbeing. In its
examination of how EM comports with traditional punishment theories,
this Section will address retributive, expressive, deterrence, and
rehabilitative theories in turn.
1. Electronic Monitoring as Retributive
According to retributive theory, offenders morally deserve
punishment, and this punishment should impose pain or unpleasantness.79
For the retributivist, the appropriate punishment should be proportional to
the offender’s crime.80
The first foundational question for the retributivist is whether EM
causes pain or unpleasantness. 81 The requirement that offenders wear
monitors on their persons 24/7—during all waking and sleeping hours—
will strike many as objectively unpleasant, and subjective experiences
gleaned from qualitative studies substantiate that EM imposes pain.82 One
the use of EM as a substitute for incarceration, the salient distinction is between Level 4 and Level 3.
One scholarly account, without delineating the various levels of restrictiveness, noted that “[e]lectronic
monitoring operates as an intermediate sanction because it is less severe than imprisonment, but more
restrictive than traditional probation.” Button et al., supra note 4, at 417.
78. The question whether EM use can be justified by punishment theory may be uniquely
American. Other countries that use EM routinely make assumptions about its punitiveness. See, e.g.,
George Mair & Mike Nellis, ‘Parallel Tracks’ Probation and Electronic Monitoring in England,
Wales and Scotland, in ELECTRONICALLY MONITORED PUNISHMENT, supra note 1, at 63, 77 (noting
that in England and Wales, EM was adopted as a way to make probation more punitive). Accounts from
the criminology literature also routinely conclude that EM is a punitive sanction. See, e.g., William
Bülow, Electronic Monitoring of Offenders An Ethical Review, 20 SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 505, 514
(2014) (asserting that EM “can be conceptualized as a form of punishment, that is, it is an intended
deprivation (of freedom of movement) on the offender authorized by the state as a response for his or
her criminal offense”).
79. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4–5 (1955). See also John Bronsteen,
Retribution’s Role, 84 IND. L.J. 1129, 1129 (2009); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 343, 347 (1983).
80. See, e.g., RICHARD L. LIPPKE, RETHINKING IMPRISONMENT 111–12 (2007) (“The aim of
legal punishment . . . is . . . to impose equalizing losses on [offenders] in ways consistent with
recognizing their status as autonomous moral beings.”)
81. This premise appears to be taken for granted in the broader international context, where use
of EM is debated but its punitiveness is assumed. See, e.g., Mair & Nellis, supra note 78, at 77–78.
82. See, e.g., BALES ET AL., supra note 12, at 89–102 (discussing the effect of EM on offenders’
relationships); Payne & Gainey, supra note 33, at 418, 421–22 tbl.1 (describing survey responses of
forty-nine offenders on EM). See also Joan Petersilia & Elizabeth Piper Deschenes, What Punishes?
Inmates Rank the Severity of Prison vs. Intermediate Sanctions, FED. PROB., Mar. 1994, at 3, 3
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individual subject to EM explained: “The ankle bracelet is the bane of my
every day existence. I loathe it with every pore in my body. It is unsightly,
uncomfortable and huge.” 83 Another reported that the EM device “was
beating my ankle into a bloody pulp.” 84 Thus, the answer to the
retributivist’s first question is that EM often does cause pain and
unpleasantness to those who are required to wear the monitoring devices.85
The second foundational question for retributivists is whether EM,
with or without other punishment conditions, is proportional to a given
offender’s crime. This is an inherently subjective and contextual
determination. To a large extent, the proportionality of a punishment is in
the eye of the beholder, and criminal justice norms differ across individuals
and jurisdictions. For example, in Finland, fines are routinely used as a
criminal punishment.86 By contrast, in the United States, there is no social
consensus that fines are punitive.87 Importantly, because proportionality is
context dependent, it is also malleable as underlying criminal justice norms
evolve.88 Thus, perceptions regarding the suitability of EM as a sanction

(discussing subjective perceptions of interprediate sanction programs); Peter B. Wood & Harold G.
Grasmick, supra note 31, at 19 (finding that offenders may experience “alternative sanctions as
significantly more punitive than imprisonment”).
83. Electronic Ball and Chain (Day 25), 180 DAYS ON HOUSE ARREST (Oct. 25, 2009),
https://the180daysblog.wordpress.com/category/house-arrest/ankle-bracelet.
84. Problems Plague GPS Tracking of WA Offenders, supra note 75. See also Electronic Ball
and Chain (Day 25), supra note 83 (“I am always tired since House Arrest began, I believe it is a
combination of the random phone calls which seem to come at 5:30–6:00 AM quite often, and the
constant, annoying, discomfort. This I also feel is a component of the sadistic punishment, sleep
deprivation.”)
85. This conclusion is not meant to suggest that every offender experiences EM similarly. For
example, one study found that “older offenders find [EM] to be more punitive than younger offenders
do.” Brian K. Payne et al., The Pains’ of Electronic Monitoring A Slap on the Wrist or Just as Bad as
Prison?, 27 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 133, 145 (2014). However, this lack of uniformity does not refute
evidence that, in the aggregate, EM is experienced as punitive.
86. EDWIN W. ZEDLEWSKI, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ No. 230401,
ALTERNATIVES TO CUSTODIAL SUPERVISION: THE DAY FINE 3 (2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/grants/230401.pdf (describing the history of day fines, which were first used in Finland in 1921); Joe
Pinsker, Finland, Home of the $103,000 Speeding Ticket, ATLANTIC (Mar. 12, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/finland-home-of-the-103000-speeding-ticket/387
484.
87. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 618–19
(1996).
88. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.10A cmt. b, at 59–60 (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft
No. 2, 2008), quoted in Douglas A. Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness, and Finality for
Sentences, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 151, 171 (2014) (“On proportionality grounds, societal
assessments of offense gravity and offender capability sometimes change over the course of a
generation or comparable period. In recent history, . . . there has been flux in community attitudes
toward some classes of drug offenders, and even in crime categories as serious as homicide, such as
when a battered spouse kills an abusive husband or in cases of assisted suicide.”).
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for a particular crime may change over time.
To satisfy the retributivist, the specific use of EM (as well as the
particularities of the technology) could be calibrated in accordance with the
demands of proportionality. Punishments could vary on a number of axes:
amount of time subject to EM, additional restrictions (for example, where
and when the monitored person could travel), and visibility or size of the
monitor. For example, the addition of other sanctions would make the
aggregate effect of EM more painful (for example, EM in addition to home
confinement as opposed to EM alone). Additionally, the size of the
monitor, and whether the monitor is designed to be worn over or under the
offender’s clothing, could make the punishment of EM more or less severe.
In theory, a proportionality inquiry might require that, for some crimes, a
large, bulky monitor should be worn over the offender’s outer layer of
clothing while, for others, a smaller, less visible device would suffice. The
length of time one is subject to EM should also be important to the
retributivist. Since qualitative data suggest that EM is experienced as
painful, each day that a person spends subject to EM is another day’s
experience of pain and unpleasantness.
The use of EM as a substitute for incarceration can be justified since,
having established that EM causes the offender pain, it follows that the
imposition of EM would be proportional to some crime or, at least, that the
addition of EM as a component part of an offender’s sentence would be
proportional. The remaining challenge for the retributivist is an age-old
one: to calibrate punishment to crime.89
Of course, the retributivist might believe that EM—even as part of a
home confinement program—could never be a proportionate punishment
for certain crimes, such as the particularly heinous crime of murder.90 Here
the concern would be that the monitoring sanction is not sufficiently
painful given the severity of the offender’s crime. But presumably the same
retributivist would feel differently about less serious crimes, such as
shoplifting.
Ultimately, any effort to calibrate punishment to crime brings us back
to default presumptions about the appropriateness of particular sanctions. If
the default presumption is that offenders convicted of a certain crime
should go to jail or prison, then anything less than incarceration may appear
89. Calibrating punishment to crime is inherently subjective. See Kolber, supra note 71, at 182.
90. See, e.g., Max Fisher, A Different Justice Why Anders Breivik Only Got 21 Years for Killing
77 People, ATLANTIC (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/08/adifferent-justice-why-anders-breivik-only-got-21-years-for-killing-77-people/261532.
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indulgent or, at the very least, not sufficiently punitive. To the extent that
this is the case for certain crimes in the United States, EM as substitute,
even when used as part of a bundle of sanctions, may not satisfy the
retributivist. By contrast, where fines are the expected punishment for
many crimes,91 incarceration for such crimes would seem overly punitive.
Crucially, this baseline is malleable, as are the social norms that inform it
and are informed by it. If we were to begin punishing certain classes of
offenders by EM or criminal fines instead of incarceration, this may at first
seem unusual (or possibly even unfair to those who were incarcerated for
the same behavior at a different time), but eventually it would become the
new default presumption.92
Determining how to weigh different sanctions based on level of
restrictiveness, among other factors, imposes yet another subjective
dimension. For example, California and Rhode Island both routinely
impose EM for the duration of an offender’s sentence, but these states use
different EM-to-incarceration ratios. California uses a 1:1 ratio (that is, a
six-month sentence to jail would be substituted with six months of home
confinement with EM),93 while Rhode Island employs a 2:1 ratio (that is,
the same six-month jail sentence would be substituted with one year of
community confinement with EM).94 These examples illustrate the lack of
consensus regarding the EM-to-incarceration ratio and may also speak to
the inherent subjectivity associated with the retributivist’s determination of
proportionality.

91. Hanns von Hofer, Notes on Crime and Punishment in Sweden and Scandinavia, in ANNUAL
REPORT FOR 1999 AND RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES NO. 57, at 283, 289 (UNAFEI ed., 2001),
www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/RS_No57/No57_26VE_Hofer.pdf (noting that 81 percent of those
convicted in Finland receive fines, the highest percentage of any Scandinavian country).
92. By analogy, over time, many behaviors that were once criminal have been legalized.
Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1070–71 (2015)
(discussing decriminalization of marijuana in eighteen states and decriminalization of “traffic offenses,
regulatory offenses, and urban order maintenance”).
93. Telephone Interview with Kevin O’Connell, Research Analyst, Probation Officers of Cal.
(Jan. 12, 2016).
94. Perhaps one reason why Rhode Island settled on a 2:1 ratio is because its Community
Confinement program was one of the very first of its kind. It was not put into place primarily because of
budgetary concerns, so maybe there was more thought devoted to what the ideal ratio would be to
satisfy retributive (as well as other) concerns. Or, perhaps, the ratio was chosen because of the
widespread intuition—and documentation by offenders—that home confinement plus EM is simply less
restrictive than prison or jail. Payne & Gainey, supra note 33, at 428 (“Electronic monitoring is heaven
compared to jail. . . . I learned a very valuable lesson but house arrest is better than jail. . . . It
was . . . not as bad as the shame of jail.”). Ultimately, there is no universal ratio, and as EM use
continues to expand as a substitute for incarceration, it will be interesting to see whether these ratios
become more varied or whether a 1:1 ratio becomes commonplace.
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2. Electronic Monitoring as Expressive
According to expressive theory, laws and their enforcement patterns
influence social norms and send messages about the values of a society.95
Thus, the expressivist will care especially about what message is sent by
the use of EM as a criminal sanction.
A classic example of expressive punishment is shaming penalties,96
which are “explicitly designed to make a public spectacle of the offender’s
conviction and punishment, and to trigger a negative, downward change in
the offender’s self-concept.” 97 The expressivist might favor use of an
electronic monitor as a shaming sanction or expression of blame 98 —a
modern-day “scarlet letter” 99 —to send the message to both the offender
and the wider community that the offender’s conduct is unacceptable and
will be punished.100 To manifest this expression of disapproval, the monitor
would need to be visible.
The expressivist would condone the use of EM as a component of an
offender’s punishment. Individuals subject to EM have described the
monitoring devices as a source of embarrassment and shame, 101 and the
imposition of EM as a sanction can be said to send a message both to the
offender and to society more broadly. According to one individual subject
to EM: “It truly is the electronic version of the ball and chain, there is never
a waking moment I am not aware of its presence on my person. The band is
loose enough so that the box can be rotated 360 degrees, but no matter how
you spin it . . . it is always reminding me it is there.” 102 Others have
experienced unpleasant encounters with family members, friends, and
95. See, e.g., Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 860 (2014);
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 949–62 (1995); Richard
H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 339 (2000); Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022–23 (1996).
96. See, e.g., Chad Flanders, Shame and the Meanings of Punishment, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 609,
612 (2006); Kahan, supra note 87, at 594; James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame
Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1061 (1998).
97. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880,
1886 (1991).
98. Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 803 (1997) (crediting the expressionists with bringing to light the
role of blame in defining punishment).
99. See generally NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Brian Harding ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 2d ed. 2007) (1850).
100. Bülow, supra note 78, at 512 (considering, though ultimately rejecting, the argument that
“the feeling of shame ascribed to the offender when he or she has to wear a device which can
potentially be displayed is desirable, since it may foster a sense of repentance”).
101. See, e.g., Payne & Gainey, supra note 33, at 417.
102. Electronic Ball and Chain (Day 25), supra note 83.

142

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:123

prospective employers as a result of their EM devices,103 suggesting that
these devices are perceived as shaming by society at large.
3. Electronic Monitoring as Deterrent
The deterrence theorist will prioritize crime prevention, 104 and will
assess possible punishments using a cost-benefit analysis,105 weighing both
positive and negative consequences of punishment. 106 Both general
deterrence and specific deterrence are relevant to the analysis of EM and
punishment theory.107
For EM use to be justified by the principle of general deterrence, the
imposition of EM must cause sufficient unpleasantness such that potential
criminals will view that punishment as a cost they want to avoid.108 Since
EM imposes unpleasantness—including physical pain and mental
anguish 109 —and may adversely impact relationships with friends and
family as well as employment prospects, 110 EM should function as a
deterrent for prospective criminals. Of course, given that EM is less
restrictive than incarceration,111 it cannot be said that EM would deter as
much as the threat of incarceration. However, since an offender cannot
realistically anticipate ex ante whether, if caught, the offender would serve
time in jail or prison or be subject to EM, 112 or a combination, this
restrictiveness (and deterrence) differential should not matter in practice.113
For EM use to satisfy the principles of specific deterrence theory,
103. See, e.g., BALES ET AL., supra note 12, at 89–97 (discussing the impact of EM on offenders’
relationships).
104. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 322–24 (Charles Kay Ogden ed., F.B.
Rothman 1931). Many have critiqued deterrence theory. See, e.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, A Critical
Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence Theory, 88 DICK. L. REV. 1, 7 (1983).
105. Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323, 344 (2004).
106. See R. A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 18 (2001); Bülow, supra
note 78, at 515.
107. John B. Mitchell, Crimes of Misery and Theories of Punishment, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 465,
487–93 (2012).
108. This calculus must be delicately calibrated to avoid the problem of overdeterrence. See, e.g.,
Walter Olsen, Overdeterrence and the Problem of Comparative Risk, 37 PROC. ACAD. COMP. RISK 42,
43 (1988).
109. See, e.g., Payne & Gainey, supra note 33, at 417.
110. See, e.g., BALES ET AL., supra note 12, at 89–97.
111. See Martin et al., supra note 12, at 565.
112. A notable exception would be if EM were imposed as a default sanction for certain crimes as
a substitute, though this is unlikely, and a case-based determination is far more plausible.
113. Deterrence theory might support the use of bulky or unwieldy monitoring devices if
necessary to deter prospective criminals. Questions of degree (both of calibrating the EM device and of
determining the deterrent effect of EM relative to incarceration) are empirical ones that call for future
research.
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offenders should be deterred from reoffending because they are afraid of
being caught. 114 Specific deterrence in this context has an almost
“incapacitating” function. 115 The question of how effective EM is on
specific deterrence grounds is an empirical one. Two factors crucial to the
efficacy of EM as a specific deterrent are the technology itself and the
people monitoring the devices.116
Furthermore, since more than 95 percent of all incarcerated offenders
will eventually be released,117 and since prisons and jails are known to be
criminogenic,118 it follows that limiting offenders’ exposure to prison and
jail may make them less predisposed to future criminal activity. 119
Deterrence arguments support the use of EM instead of imprisoning
offenders who do not present a significant risk to the public.120 Given the

114. An added deterrent aspect of EM is that, if offenders are caught, they will be subject to more
punitive sanctions, namely jail or prison. Preliminary qualitative work suggests that this is part of the
offender’s calculus: “I wouldn’t escape. That’s another charge, more time. . . . Well anyone that’s on
the monitoring is stupid if they try to escape because they are the one that’s going to suffer
consequences.” Payne & Gainey, supra note 33, at 425.
115. Generally, incapacitation entails removing offenders from society by either locking them up
in jail or prison or otherwise restraining them. While incapacitation is a component of utilitarian
punishment theory, an analysis of EM through the lens of incapacitation is not applicable: as with other
alternatives to incarceration, EM outside of prison or jail walls by definition does not incapacitate.
116. Critics of EM have highlighted limitations of the technology that may minimize the
effectiveness of the sanction. For example, a GPS device may fail to send appropriate alerts. See, e.g.,
Paige St. John, Tests Found Major Flaws in Parolee GPS Monitoring Devices, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 30,
2013) [hereinafter St. John, Tests Found Major Flaws], http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/30/local/lame-ff-gps-monitors-20130331. Or there may be many false positives. See, e.g., Mario Koran, Lost
Signals, Disconnected Lives, WISCONSINWATCH.ORG (Mar. 24, 2013), http://wisconsinwatch.org/2013/
03/lost-signals-disconnected-lives. These factors may cause those tasked with responding not to take the
alarms seriously. Additionally, critics have expressed concern that those tasked with oversight and
response may lack proper training or may be supervising such a large number of offenders that they
simply cannot be sufficiently responsive to all of them. See, e.g., Report Prisons System Lacks
Guidelines for Electronic Monitoring (Colorado Public Radio radio broadcast Aug. 31, 2014),
http://www.cpr.org/news/audio/report-prisons-system-lacks-guidelines-electronic-monitoring; Paige St.
John, GPS Monitoring Alerts Overwhelm Probation Officers, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2014),
http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/15/local/la-me-ff-gps-overload-20140216. While these are serious
concerns, as the technology continues to improve and as resources are allocated for appropriate training
of those overseeing EM programs, these concerns are not insurmountable.
117. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRISONS & CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 711 (Mary Bosworth ed., 2005).
118. See generally Scott D. Camp & Gerald G. Gaes, Criminogenic Effects of the Prison
Environment on Inmate Behavior Some Experimental Evidence, 51 CRIME & DELINQ. 425 (2005)
(testing the intuition that prisons are criminogenic).
119. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 12, at 477; Payne & Gainey, supra note 33, at 416–17.
120. While the lower costs of EM as compared with prison have been discussed elsewhere, see
infra notes 163–165 and accompanying text, it bears mentioning that the utilitarian who is concerned
with incapacitating offenders to avoid their commission of future crimes will also be inclined to engage
in a cost-benefit analysis. EM offers significant cost savings as compared with incarceration, which
should make it more attractive to the utilitarian.
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high level of risk-aversion of parole agents and other criminal justice
stakeholders, 121 many of these low-risk offenders would otherwise be
incarcerated if not for the availability of EM technology. 122 Indeed, the
availability of EM technology should inspire criminal justice leaders to
think carefully about the distinction between those who present a high risk
to the public, and therefore should be subject to the highest level of
restraint (that is, prison), and those whose risk factors do not rise to that
level and should instead be subject to a lower level of restrictiveness (for
example, EM with or without home confinement).123
4. Electronic Monitoring as Rehabilitative
The theorist whose priority is rehabilitation will care most about the
offender’s eventual ability to reintegrate into society. 124 One who is
rehabilitated will not recidivate, so rehabilitative principles would demand
that an offender avoid criminogenic environments while gaining access to
whatever treatment, educational, or vocational programs would aid in that
person’s reintegration. Other factors that may facilitate reentry include
maintaining close ties with the offender’s family and community. 125 The
use of EM as a substitute for incarceration could allow the offender to
maintain these relationships while avoiding the criminogenic prison or jail
environment.
Crucially, EM is not inherently rehabilitative. 126 EM at best is a
facilitating device127—a tool that can be used as part of a “rehabilitationrollout,” which might include cognitive-behavioral treatment, educational
121. Telephone Interview with Patricia Caruso, Former Dir., Mich. Dep’t of Corrections (July 15,
2014).
122. Of course, the same could be true of those convicted of more serious crimes—for example,
sex offenders in Michigan, who would have remained incarcerated (rather than released on parole) if
not for the option of EM. Id.
123. While it would be foolhardy to consider EM and incarceration as the only two options, EM
provides an alternative sanction that can achieve specific deterrence goals while also avoiding the
criminogenic environment of prison.
124. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 407–
10 (1958).
125. Id.
126. See Bülow, supra note 78, at 516.
127. Perhaps the best argument that there is something inherently rehabilitative about EM is less
about the device itself and more about “show[ing] offenders that society is placing trust back into
them.” Payne & Gainey, supra note 33, at 416. Arguably, this is also an expressive justification for the
use of EM as a substitute for incarceration, specifically in the early release context. Randy R. Gainey et
al., The Relationships Between Time in Jail, Time on Electronic Monitoring, and Recidivism An Event
History Anlaysis of a Jail-Based Program, 17 JUST. Q. 733, 748 (2000) (“[J]ail incarceration followed
by electronic monitoring affords offenders respect by trusting them with early release into the
community.”).
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programming, or vocational training.128 One whose priority is rehabilitation
would thus insist that EM use was part of a program tailored toward reentry
rather than mere incapacitation. A preliminary study suggests that, when
EM is used as part of such a tailored program, offenders experience EM as
rehabilitative. 129 Nearly 95 percent of a study of forty-nine offenders
“agree[d]” or “strongly agree[d]” that the EM sanction, when part of a
rehabilitation rollout, “helps in treating offenders by maintaining close
supervision, may be effective because the offender can still work, may be
effective because the offender can maintain contact with his or her family,
and may be effective because the offender can help with his or her
household duties.”130 Unlike the expressivist or the deterrence theorist, one
whose priority is rehabilitation should also prefer that the EM device not be
large, unwieldy, or uncomfortable; if the goal is successful reentry into
mainstream society, a less stigmatic and more discreet monitor should be
favored.
II. THE NEW MASS MONITORING AND THE
SUBSTITUTION/ADDITION DISTINCTION
The introduction of GPS technology, which allows for 24/7
supervision of offenders, both expanded and complicated EM’s role as a
burgeoning alternative to incarceration. This Part first highlights the
expansion of EM use as an alternative to incarceration to new offender
subpopulations. It then introduces the substitution/addition distinction,
discussing the novel use of EM as an added sanction. This distinction
between the use of EM as a substitute for incarceration and its use as an
added sanction clarifies conflicting rhetoric surrounding the criminal
justice use of EM and has significant implications for punishment theory.
If, as Part I maintains, criminal justice use of EM should be characterized
as punitive, EM’s use as a substitute for incarceration is justifiable, while
its use as an added sanction to an existing, proportionate punishment
cannot be justified.

128. For example, a study of “high-risk offenders supervised with an electronic monitoring
device” found that these offenders “had a greater likelihood of completing treatment,” and that “the
interaction between these two interventions—cognitive-behavioral treatment and electronic
monitoring—reduced recidivism.” Button et al., supra note 4, at 418.
129. Id.
130. Payne & Gainey, supra note 33, at 423.
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A. GPS AND THE EXPANSION OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING TO NEW
POPULATIONS
By the late 1990s, a new monitoring technology entered the
corrections scene. 131 GPS technology, which relies on a network of
satellites to provide accurate location and time information, was originally
designed for military use by the U.S. Department of Defense but was soon
appropriated for use by telephone companies and corrections
departments.132 In 1998, forty individuals were subject to criminal justice
supervision via GPS monitoring systems.133 Within two years, the number
had increased to six hundred.134
EM’s continued and expanded use as a substitute for incarceration is
consonant with traditional EM use and envisions EM as a favorable
alternative to incarceration on fiscal and humanitarian axes. For example,
GPS technology has been embraced in California as a component of
“realignment,” the state’s plan to reduce prison overcrowding. 135
California’s realignment legislation resulted from the U.S. Supreme
Court’s ruling in 2011 that California’s prisons were unconstitutionally
overcrowded. 136 California has realigned thousands of state offenders to
local jails, and EM has been used with respect to a broad array of offenders
as a substitute for incarceration.137 Eligible offenders are classified as part
of the “three nons” category: their crimes are characterized as nonviolent,
nonsexual, and nonserious.138 Offenders who fall into this category might
serve their entire sentence in jail, or they might serve a split sentence (that

131. Scott Vollum & Chris Hale, Electronic Monitoring A Research Review, CORRECTIONS
COMPENDIUM, July 2002, at 1, 1.
132. Marc Renzema, How the Global Positioning System Works, J. OFFENDER MONITORING,
Spring 1998, at 8, 8 (describing as the primary Defense Department goal to use GPS technology to
locate downed soldiers and missile silos).
133. Marc Renzema, Tracking GPS A Third Look, J. OFFENDER MONITORING, Spring 2000, at 6,
6.
134. Id. While GPS monitoring grew quickly in popularity, it did not immediately replace radio
frequency technology. According to a 2003 report, at that point radio frequency technology was still the
dominant monitoring technology, used for almost 90 percent of criminal justice uses of EM. Conway,
supra note 52, at 21. Some states, such as Rhode Island, made the decision not to switch to GPS
technology (at least in the community confinement context), preferring the lower-cost, less privacyintrusive radio frequency technology. Interview with Anne D’Alessio, supra note 58 (explaining that,
for the Community Confinement program, this more “intrusive” technology was “unnecessary”).
135. Telephone Interview with Kevin O’Connell, supra note 93.
136. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011).
137. Telephone Interview with Kevin O’Connell, supra note 93.
138. Id.; Chief Probation Officers of Cal., Public Safety Realignment—What Is It?, CPOC ISSUE
BRIEF, Summer 2012, at 1, 1, http://www.cpoc.org/assets/Realignment/public%20safety%20
realignment%20brief%201.pdf.
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is, part of their sentence in jail and part of it on EM), or they might serve
their entire sentence on EM.139 For whatever portion of their sentence they
serve on EM, they receive that amount of credit for time served—a 1:1
ratio of EM to incarceration.140
With the advent of GPS, EM was no longer inextricably connected to
an offender’s home. Rather, it provided a means to identify the specific
whereabouts of an offender 24/7 and to create zones of inclusion and
exclusion. Accordingly, the archetypal example of EM coupled with house
arrest gave way to new archetypes and offender populations. For example,
in the pretrial context, an experimental program in Indiana used EM as an
alternative to pretrial detention for offenders who could not afford bail.141
Such programs have continued to grow, as cost savings of using EM as an
alternative to pretrial detention are substantial. In Seminole County,
Florida, “releasing suspects on bond with electronic monitoring as a
condition has resulted in savings of more than $948,000 by not housing
people in the jail at a cost of $80 per day.”142
EM use also was expanded to offender subpopulations that historically
were not eligible for EM—most notably, those convicted of sex offenses,143
a uniquely vilified category of offenders.144 GPS monitoring was appealing
in the sex offender context both because it allowed 24/7 supervision of
offenders and because it facilitated the enforcement of exclusion zones
where an offender was forbidden to travel. For example, sex offenders
routinely are prohibited from traveling within a certain distance of schools
or parks, and GPS technology can be programmed to set off an alarm that
would alert corrections staff if an offender has violated these travels
139. Telephone Interview with Kevin O’Connell, supra note 93. These decisions differ by county,
and no aggregate statistics are currently available. Collecting comprehensive survey data from this
“natural experiment” is a subject for future research.
140. Id.
141. Michael G. Maxfield & Terry L. Baumer, Home Detention with Electronic Monitoring
Comparing Pretrial and Postconviction Programs, 36 CRIME & DELINQ. 521, 522–23 (1990).
142. Elyssa Cherney, Lingering Questions over GPS Monitoring Delay Action, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (June 22, 2015, 5:52 PM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-gps-orange-countycourts-20150622-story.html (reporting on a six-year period from 2009 through 2015).
143. Darren Gowen, Remote Location Monitoring—A Supervision Strategy to Enhance Risk
Control, FED. PROB., Sept. 2001, at 38, 40.
144. See, e.g., Karen Harrison, Preface to MANAGING HIGH-RISK SEX OFFENDERS IN THE
COMMUNITY, at xvii, xvii (Karen Harrison ed., 2010); Kelly K. Bonnar-Kidd, Sexual Offender Laws
and Prevention of Sexual Violence or Recidivism, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 412, 412 (2010); Editorial,
Do Sex Offenders Deserve a Scarlet Letter on Their Passport?, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2016, 5:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-0203-sex-offenders-20160203-story.html (discussing
the vilification of sex offenders in reference to a congressional proposal to mark the passports of some
sex offenders post-sentence so they would be identifiable while traveling abroad).
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restrictions.145
Especially in the context of parole, some states have used GPS
monitoring of sex offenders as a substitute for incarceration. For example,
in Michigan, the Parole Board historically was reluctant to release eligible
sex offenders, but it changed course once promised that these parolees
would be subject to GPS monitoring. In 2003, Michigan’s prison system
housed 17,000 sex offenders who had passed their earliest release date;
these prisoners were legally eligible for parole yet were routinely denied it.
At that time, the parole rate in Michigan for sex offenders was 11
percent. 146 Patricia Caruso, the newly appointed Director of Michigan’s
Department of Corrections, believed that this rate could increase if she
managed to stratify sex offenders to separate out “who we’re angry at from
who we’re actually afraid of.”147 Central to this strategy was a $10 million
investment in GPS technology.
EM helped to drastically reduce the population of sex offenders in
prison. Under the “new regime” that Caruso oversaw, 100 percent of
paroled sex offenders would be on active GPS monitoring. Caruso
restructured parole supervision so there would be “sex offender specialists”
with special training. 148 By 2011, when Caruso left the Department of
Corrections, the parole rate for sex offenders had increased to 50
percent.149 Caruso described the “peace of mind” that EM provided, which
enabled the parole board to become more comfortable with the idea of
granting parole to sex offenders. 150 Notably, none of these parolees was
convicted for another sex offense.151
B. THE USE OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING AS AN ADDED SANCTION
Beyond the use of GPS monitoring as a substitute for incarceration,
the introduction of GPS technology into the criminal justice sphere resulted
in a spike of novel uses of EM as an addition—an added condition for
individuals who are no longer subject to probation or parole (what is
colloquially referred to as “off paper”). 152 The use of EM as an added
145. See Jonathan J. Wroblewski, ReSTART GPS, Offender Reentry, and a New Paradigm for
Determinate Sentencing, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 314, 315 (2008).
146. Telephone Interview with Patricia Caruso, supra note 121.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. Caruso also explained that she would not have guessed how effective and successful GPS
technology would be, recounting that many employers were open to working with people on parole. Id.
151. Id.
152. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Lost Voices The Civic and Political Views of
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condition—rather than as a way to reduce prison overcrowding, save
money, or promote rehabilitation—has been particularly prevalent in the
sex offender context. For example, in 2005, Florida lawmakers enacted the
Jessica Lunsford Act, which included the provision that certain sex
offenders would be subject to GPS monitoring for life.153 This means that,
in Florida, after some offenders complete their sentences and would
otherwise be released from criminal justice purview, they remain subject to
EM for the rest of their lives. The Florida law neither provides for
individual assessment nor allows review based on documentation of
changed circumstances. 154 Many states have followed Florida’s lead and
require sex offenders to be electronically monitored for some amount of
time post-sentence.155 In twelve states, some sex offenders are subject to
lifetime GPS monitoring.156
This additive use of EM represents a striking departure from the
traditional conception of EM as well as from its prior uses. When EM is
used as an added condition—or collateral consequence 157 —it imposes
additional costs but does not aid in reducing imprisonment.158 This additive
use thus runs counter to the founding principles of EM: to reduce and
eventually eliminate the need for prisons and jails. Yet these uses of EM as
an added condition are imposed on persons by virtue of their having been
brought into the criminal justice system, and they arguably have the same
social meaning associated with punishment as does EM when used as a
substitute for incarceration.
The new mass monitoring can best be understood as bifurcated—used
either as a substitute or as an added condition—and it demands an analytic
approach that takes these two distinct uses into account. As the next
Section illustrates, disaggregating the uses of EM as substitute and addition
helps to clarify discourse and reconcile competing claims about mass
monitoring.
Disenfranchised Felons, in IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION,
supra note 9, at 165, 182.
153. Jessica Lunsford Act, 2005 FLA. LAWS ch. 28 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
FLA. STAT.).
154. See id.
155. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-207 (2016).
156. See supra note 8.
157. For a general discussion of collateral consequences, see Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating
the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45 B.C. L. REV. 255, 258 (2004).
158. That is, it does not substitute the sanction of incarceration with the sanction of EM. However,
the use of EM as an addition potentially could reduce recidivism through deterrence and incapacitation,
thus reducing imprisonment overall. Studies of the recidivism-reduction effect of EM, however, are
inconclusive. See infra notes 292–297 and accompanying text.
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C. MASS MONITORING RHETORIC
Criminal justice use of EM has generated polarized reactions.
Supporters stress the cost savings associated with EM as well as its
rehabilitative potential. Detractors focus on the intrusiveness of EM,
expressing concerns about a net-widening effect, that EM use will
significantly expand the purview of the criminal justice system and the
number of individuals subject to government surveillance. 159 These
conflicting claims are premised on an understanding of EM as a unitary,
theoretical concept that is either a wholly positive or wholly negative
criminal justice development.
This Article rejects this dominant approach, identifying EM instead as
a tool that has many specific functions, and demonstrates that this
disaggregated approach enables a more nuanced understanding of the
varied uses of EM in the criminal justice system and can help to reconcile
competing normative claims. 160 Central to this preferred disaggregated
approach is the substitution/addition distinction: whether EM is used as an
added condition to an existing sanction or as a substitute for incarceration.
Indeed, closer scrutiny reveals that supporters of EM tend to assume its use
is as a substitute for incarceration, while those opposed to EM tend to
assume its use is in addition to an already proportionate punishment, and
thus is both unnecessary and excessive. The substitution/addition
distinction helps to clarify these conflicting reactions to the expansion of
EM, illustrating that these reactions are largely predicated on distinct
notions of what this expansion entails, what populations will be monitored,
and whether modern uses of EM comport with founding principles. While
it is not always possible to know for certain whether EM is being used as
an addition or substitution, the inquiry itself is crucial and often provides
persuasive evidence of how a particular use of EM relates to criminal
justice ends.
1. Support for Electronic Monitoring Use as a Substitute
Supporters of criminal justice EM tend to assume, whether explicitly
or implicitly, that it is used as a substitute for incarceration. In the face of
severely (and even unconstitutionally) 161 overcrowded prisons (and
159. Bonta et al., supra note 50, at 71–73.
160. Scholarly accounts of EM have tended to approach the technology as a concept rather than as
a tool, thus blurring EM’s many distinct criminal justice uses. See, e.g., Bülow, supra note 78, at 506
(analyzing concerns about privacy, stigmatization, and equity without disaggregating the many uses of
EM). Such abstract assessments are of limited help to legal and policy debates about EM use.
161. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011) (holding that California’s prisons were
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immigration centers) and state budget deficits, these supporters have lauded
EM as a partial solution.162 Proponents point to significant cost savings that
result from monitoring offenders rather than incarcerating them. 163
Estimates show that, including personnel costs, monitoring an individual
with a second-by-second GPS system costs approximately $20 per day.164
This is compared to $30 to $150 daily for incarceration.165
In addition to significant cost savings, proponents of EM point to the
social benefits of interfering less dramatically with offenders’ family
structures, again assuming that the alternative is prison or jail. 166

unconstitutionally overcrowded).
162. Early proponents of criminal justice use of surveillance technology included prison
abolitionists who envisioned the future use of EM as the catalyst to “empty the world’s prisons.” E.g.,
Ralph K. Schwitzgebel, Behavioral Electronics Could Empty the World’s Prisons, FUTURIST, Apr.
1970, at 59, 59–60. Many pilot EM programs have been instituted with the central goal of reducing
prison overcrowding. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7554d (2016) (“The goal of the pilot program
is to assist policymakers in determining whether electronically monitored home detention and home
confinement can be utilized . . . to save valuable bed space for detainees and inmates who . . . would
otherwise be lodged in a correctional facility.”).
163. E.g., Brian K. Payne & Randy R. Gainey, Attitudes Toward Electronic Monitoring Among
Monitored Offenders and Criminal Justice Students, 29 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 195, 196 (1999).
Others have pointed out the “opportunity cost” associated with public spending on prisons since
“resources directed to prisons could have been directed instead to another area of criminal justice, or to
education or health.” Jones, supra note 12, at 477. However, to the extent that EM is used as an
addition, states will end up paying more per offender and will need to employ more individuals to
monitor those subject to EM. See Button et al., supra note 4, at 419 (“There may not be enough time or
financial resources for officers to accomplish all of the necessary duties to adequately manage a
growing population of parolees with electronic monitoring.”).
164. Stuart S. Yeh, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Reducing Crime Through Electronic Monitoring of
Parolees and Probationers, 38 J. CRIM. JUST. 1090, 1091 (2010).
165. Natasha Alladina, The Use of Electronic Monitoring in the Alaska Criminal Justice System
A Practical Yet Incomplete Alternative to Incarceration, 28 ALASKA L. REV. 125, 144 n.136 (2011);
David Ovalle, Plan to Release Low-Level Miami-Dade Inmates on GPS Monitors to Save over $1
Million a Year, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 30, 2014, 7:14 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/
community/miami-dade/article1985206.html. Another study concluded that pretrial detention costs
more than four times the cost of EM per day. See also Marie VanNostrand & Gena Keebler, Pretrial
Risk Assessment in the Federal Court, FED. PROB., Sept. 2009, at 3, 6 (reporting that the average cost of
pretrial detention was $19,000 per defendant, compared to the average daily cost of EM, which was
between $3,100 and $4,600).
166. See, e.g., Payne & Gainey, supra note 33, at 429 (“I feel fortunate to be back in my
family. . . . I’ve been able to help my mother tremendously with household duties and yard work.”);
Matthew J. Kucharson, Note, GPS Monitoring A Viable Alternative to the Incarceration of Nonviolent
Criminals in the State of Ohio, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV 637, 639 (2006). But see James Kilgore, Progress
or More of the Same? Electronic Monitoring and Parole in the Age of Mass Incarceration, 21 CRITICAL
CRIMINOLOGY 123, 129 (2013) (noting that EM can strain familial relationships). A survey funded by
the Department of Justice found that 89 percent of probation officers believed that “offenders’
relationships with their significant others changed as a result of being placed on EM.” BALES ET AL.,
supra note 12, at 92. Both officers and those monitored observed that the ankle band had a distinct
impact on children. As one parent testified, “When it beeps, the kids worry about whether the probation
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Supporters also stress that EM may enable an offender to pursue an
education167 or to remain employed,168 which can provide many benefits,
including to the offender’s dependents.169 These advantages hearken back
to the early visions of EM as a progressive, humane alternative to
incarceration.
2. Criticism of Electronic Monitoring Use as an Addition
Detractors tend to assume that EM will be used as an added condition
and have decried the increased use of this technology as an invasive and
inhumane expansion of the power and reach of the criminal justice system.
Indeed, much of the criticism of EM has focused on the “increased state
control” that it may engender 170 and is based on an (often implicit)
officer is coming to take me to jail. The kids run for it, when it beeps.” Id. at 90. Another noted that his
child “straps a watch around his ankle to be like daddy.” Id.
167. See, e.g., John C. Rapone, Note, Thinking Outside of the Box Why Prisons Are Only Part of
the Solution, 18 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 128, 149 (2013) (emphasizing that EM can provide
opportunities for rehabilitation that include education and support from family and friends); Boone Cty.
Cmty. Corrections, GPS Monitoring, BOONE CTY. IND., http://boonecounty.in.gov/Default.aspx?
tabid=442 (last visited Jan. 6, 2017) (noting that, as part of the Boone County EM program,
“[o]ffenders without a GED or high school diploma . . . will be encouraged to complete their GED”).
168. See, e.g., Inka Wennerberg, High Level of Support and High Level of Control An Efficient
Swedish Model of Electronic Monitoring?, in ELECTRONICALLY MONITORED PUNISHMENT, supra note
1, at 113, 119. However, while EM could be used to facilitate employment, offenders subject to EM
have complained about significant obstacles due to requirements associated with EM. One advised that
the Maryland Department of Corrections should allow offenders to schedule their day so they can
preserve time to search for jobs, questioning the wisdom of extensive restrictions regarding time outside
the home for someone already wearing a GPS monitor. Put simply, “I’m on GPS; why are you asking
where I’m at?” James Kilgore, Shawn Harris Advice to MDOC on Electronic Monitoring, YOUTUBE
(Aug. 10, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pIauXw100ys. One individual who had
experienced EM reflected on the challenges associated with seeking or maintaining a job while on EM:
“A good eighty, ninety percent of [employers] will have a problem” with an interviewee arriving under
EM; “if they know you’re under that monitoring system, you’re pretty much—you know you’re not
going to get that job.” James Kilgore, Shawn Harris Talks About Finding a Job on GPS, YOUTUBE
(Aug. 10, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7yeKk1jJyMI. An attorney representing a company
that declined to hire an applicant on EM explained that the applicant’s “two-hour application process
was disrupted four to six times by his GPS device,” “indicat[ing] a high level of potential for disruption
in any assignment where the applicant could be placed.” Koran, supra note 116 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
169. See, e.g., Edna Erez et al., Electronic Monitoring of Domestic Violence Cases—A Study of
Two Bilateral Programs, FED. PROB., June 2004, at 15, 16, 18. But see Kilgore, supra note 166, at 129–
31 (noting that EM can make it difficult to find employment). While the Danish criminal justice system
is different in many respects from that of the United States, a study in Denmark reported that offenders
who were monitored while remaining gainfully employed were less likely to be dependent on state
benefits when compared to their incarcerated counterparts. Lars Højsgaard Andersen & Signe Hald
Andersen, Losing the Stigma of Incarceration Does Serving a Sentence with Electronic Monitoring
Causally Improve Post-Release Labor Market Outcomes? 24 (Rockwood Found. Research Unit &
Univ. Press of S. Den., Study Paper No. 40, 2012).
170. See Michael Tonry & Mary Lynch, Intermediate Sanctions, 20 CRIME & JUST. 99, 122
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assumption that EM is being used as an added condition.171 This concern is
particularly salient in the pretrial context, when defendants are presumed
innocent and would, in the absence of EM, be released either on their own
recognizance or after posting bail (and without any additional
restrictions).172
Critics have also raised concerns that EM could eventually replace
traditional probation. 173 According to one detractor, “the question that
arises is less ‘why would the state want to remotely monitor and manage
offenders’ locations?’ and more ‘why would it not?’” 174 Implicit in this
observation is the concern that, unlike prisons, monitoring costs are so
minimal that there may be little reason for states to reduce the imposition
that EM makes on the freedom of disenfranchised groups.
Private companies—including private prisons—increasingly are
investing in monitoring technology, 175 which has given rise to concerns

(1996) (citing an EM program in Arizona that was originally created to provide early release for lowlevel offenders, but, due to the reluctance of parole boards to approve inmates for eligibility and a rate
of technical violations two times the rate for ordinary parolees, became a way to exercise more stringent
controls over inmates than would have been previously possible); Molly Carney, Note, Correction
Through Omniscience Electronic Monitoring and the Escalation of Crime Control, 40 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 279, 294 (2012).
171. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 170, at 296; Wiseman, supra note 13, at 1376–77. U.S. criminal
justice norms with respect to EM vary considerably from those of some European, and particularly
Scandinavian, countries. For example, in Greece, EM is viewed as excessively punitive for any criminal
justice purpose and has been categorically prohibited. Mike Nellis, Understanding the Electronic
Monitoring of Offenders in Europe Expansion, Regulation and Prospects, 62 CRIME, L. & SOC.
CHANGE 489, 496 (2014). In Sweden, some probation (and prison) officers “thought that EM was
inhumane and represented an unacceptable intrusion in the life of offenders, inconsistent with basic
probation values.” Mike Nellis & Jan Bungerfeldt, Electronic Monitoring and Probation in Sweden and
England and Wales Comparative Policy Developments, 60 PROB. J. 278, 283 (2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
172. See Burns, supra note 3, at 88 (citing arguments from organizations such as the ACLU). Of
course, EM in this context is used as a condition of bail, which raises the question: if not for the
possibility of EM, would the suspect have been given the option of money bail, or would the suspect
otherwise have been detained?
173. See Elizabeth D. Chicknavorian, Note, House Arrest A Viable Alternative to the Current
Prison System, 16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 53, 59–60 (1990).
174. Mike Nellis, Surveillance-Based Compliance Using Electronic Monitoring, in WHAT WORKS
IN OFFENDER COMPLIANCE 143, 161 (Pamela Ugwudike & Peter Raynor eds., 2013).
175. Private industry stakeholders have begun adapting to changing times by investing in
surveillance, reentry, non-criminal detention, and probation, “looking at all streams to generate
revenue” and pursuing the “grow or die” strategy. Avlana K. Eisenberg, Incarceration Incentives in the
Decarceration Era, 69 VAND. L. REV. 71, 119 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he GEO
Group recently acquired Behavioral Interventions, a GPS monitoring company,” and “[i]n 2009,
Behavioral Interventions signed a five-year, $372 million contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) to monitor nearly 30,000 immigrants awaiting asylum or deportation hearings.” Id.
at 119–21. For private prison companies, an investment in monitoring is a means of diversification in
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about potential conflicts of interest due to companies’ financial incentives
to monitor and incarcerate more people. Private sector investment in EM
technology thus contributes to the broader narrative of the “commercial
corrections complex.” 176 Critics have described the system as “runn[ing]
non-stop like a hamster wheel . . . it goes round and round and round and
everybody’s gettin’ their money.”177
In the pretrial context, EM detractors have expressed concern that as
private corporations continue to enter the market for EM technology, they
may lobby to add GPS as a default condition of pretrial release, even when
the suspect is non-dangerous, presents minimal flight risk, and has posted
bail.178 These concerns are not unfounded; for example, in August 2014, a
“tracker program” was instituted in Columbia, South Carolina, and during
the program’s first year, judges “made [EM] a condition of bond hundreds
of times, often for minor traffic violations or low-level misdemeanors.”179
For the private sector, EM as substitute and EM as addition represent
two separate markets where growth is possible, so manufacturers likely will
pursue both. However, especially where the EM provider is also a private
prison company, the provider has far more to gain from selling EM for use
as an added condition; for example, EM providers may prefer that EM is
used as a default pretrial sanction and that more individuals are subject to
lifetime EM upon completion of their sentences. Thus, concerns about the
private-sector influence on the growth of EM are particularly salient when
EM is used as an added condition.

the face of commitments by states to reduce their prison populations. See id. at 121. G4S, which
monitors “more than 50,000 people in 15 countries,” advertises that they offer “a robust alternative to
expensive prison custody for offenders who are deemed suitable for tagging.” Electronic Tagging
Changes Needed to Save Money,’ BBC NEWS, (Sept. 24, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-19692306.
176. J. Robert Lilly & Richard A. Ball, Selling Justice Will Electronic Monitoring Last?, 20 N.
KY. L. REV. 505, 529–30 (1993).
177. James Kilgore, “You Just Turned My Family’s House into Another Cell,” VOICE
MONITORED (Aug. 11, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), https://voiceofthemonitored.com/
2013/08/11/you-just-turned-my-familys-house-into-another-cell.
178. See, e.g., ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS 63
(2010); J. Robert Lilly, An Overview on Electronic Monitoring The United States and Britain 1988, in
THE ELECTRONIC MONITORING OF OFFENDERS 5, 5 (Ken Russell & J. Robert Lilly eds., 1989) (noting
“the development in the US of an increasingly significant number of private corporations organized to
offer ‘tagging’ services to an expanding market”).
179. Eric Markowitz, Chain Gang 2.0 If You Can’t Afford This GPS Ankle Bracelet, You Get
Thrown in Jail, INT’L. BUS. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015, 7:55 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/chain-gang-20if-you-cant-afford-gps-ankle-bracelet-you-get-thrown-jail-2065283.

2017]

MASS MONITORING

155

D. THE BASELINE PROBLEM
While the use of EM at each stage in the criminal justice process
presents discrete analytical problems, whether EM is imposed as an added
condition to or a substitute for incarceration is the most salient distinction
within each of these categories. So how can one best determine the specific
function of a particular EM use? Doing so requires asking the following
question: What would be the alternative to EM use?
This question is germane to each of the five potential criminal justice
uses of EM, and the specific inquiries are as follows:
 Pretrial: In the absence of EM, would the person be detained or be
released on personal recognizance or money bail?180
 Probation: In the absence of EM, would the person be incarcerated
or released on probation, though not subject to EM?
 Community confinement: In the absence of EM, would the person
be incarcerated or subject to house arrest without EM?
 Parole: In the absence of EM, would the person be incarcerated or
paroled without EM?
 Post-sentence: In the absence of EM, would the person be civilly
confined or subject to no criminal justice oversight?
Depending on the context of EM use and, specifically, what sanction
would attach if EM were not available, assessments of whether EM is cost
saving, net-widening, or otherwise justifiable according to various
principles will differ substantially.
Importantly, until the advent of GPS technology, the question of
whether EM was used as a substitute or added condition was a nonissue, as
EM was used exclusively as a substitute. Yet there are now plentiful
examples of EM use as substitute and added condition, often by the same
state—for example, California. In some instances, these uses are
unambiguous and easily distinguishable.
GPS technology was first used by the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation in the early 2000s as an added condition: to
monitor sex offenders post-sentence.181 This use of EM is an archetypal
example of EM as an added condition. Since the offender, post-sentence, is
technically no longer subject to criminal justice supervision, the imposition
of EM at this stage is unambiguously an added condition rather than a

180. Notably, money bail could be more or less stringent than EM depending on how high bail is
set and whether the offender is required to pay for EM. See infra Part III.B.1.
181. See Telephone Interview with Kevin O’Connell, supra note 93.
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substitute. Of course, if the individual would otherwise be civilly confined,
then EM could be understood as a less restrictive substitute for civil
confinement. Otherwise, however, this use clearly constitutes an added
condition.
Other uses of EM in California are unambiguously a substitute for
incarceration. Since the 2011 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Plata,
which mandated that California address its prison overcrowding problem,
and the resulting realignment scheme designed to comply with the court’s
order, EM has been used for a broad array of offenders as a substitute for
incarceration.182 For whatever portion of their sentence they serve on EM,
offenders receive that amount of credit for time served, a 1:1 ratio of EM to
incarceration. The 1:1 ratio of EM to incarceration represents the most
archetypal use of EM as a substitute.
For a contrasting example of EM as a substitute at the post-conviction
stage, recall that in Rhode Island, eligible post-conviction offenders can opt
into a community confinement program, where they are subject to radio
frequency monitoring, instead of going to prison or jail.183 The duration of
an offender’s stay in Community Confinement is based on a 2:1 ratio:
twice the length of the prison term the offender received.184 So while the
same offender profile in California and Rhode Island might serve the
entirety of a sentence in the community subject to EM, that offender would
be subject to criminal justice surveillance for twice the amount of time in
Rhode Island.185 Nonetheless, Rhode Island’s use of EM still fits squarely
within the substitution framework (although the 2:1 ratio raises questions
about what ratio of EM to incarceration is most defensible).
These are the easy cases. But what about borderline cases where EM
is neither obviously a substitute nor an addition? Recall the Michigan
parole example, where the use of EM helped to reduce drastically the
population of sex offenders in prison by increasing the parole rate from 11
percent to 50 percent.186 In that example, once EM was included as part of
parole, offenders were released from prison earlier than they otherwise

182. See supra notes 135–140 and accompanying text.
183. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF R.I., supra note 6, at 8.
184. Interview with Anne D’Alessio, supra note 58.
185. Notwithstanding the 2:1 ratio, virtually every eligible offender has opted for the Community
Confinement program. Id. D’Alessio explained the reasons an eligible offender might not opt to
participate: (1) the offender has no money for a phone line or (2) the offender has problems at home and
no other place to stay. Id. For those individuals who were unable to afford a phone line, the Rhode
Island Department of Corrections has provided a payment plan after the offender’s release. Id.
186. Telephone Interview with Patricia Caruso, supra note 121.
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would have been. EM thus functioned in this context as a substitute for
incarceration. However, one could imagine an analogous situation in which
EM functioned as an added condition. Suppose the counterfactual scenario
where, in the absence of the EM option, the offenders eligible for parole in
Michigan would have been released anyway. In that case, the imposition of
EM would be better understood as an added condition.
To assess whether EM in a particular context is used as a substitute or
added condition, one must first know to what sanction the offender would
be subject if not for the availability of EM technology. This presents a
potential baseline problem at every stage in the criminal justice process.
Ultimately, proper characterization of a given use of EM is a tall order
since it may not always be obvious to what sanction the offender would
have been subject if not for the availability of EM technology. Answering
this question might require asking decisionmakers, who may not
themselves know, what they would have done if the EM technology were
not available. Or it might require speculating about what decisionmakers
would have done based on how restrictive sanctions were for a given crime
in the past. An inquiry into this baseline may be pivotal for analytical
purposes, but it is also highly manipulable. Still, in many instances one can
derive some clarity by examining how EM is used more broadly in a
particular jurisdiction. For example, where EM is imposed in broad brush
strokes as a default condition (such as for all suspects pretrial or for all sex
offenders post-sentence), it may be safe to presume that EM is being used
as an added condition in at least some of these instances.
Meanwhile, the baseline problem, while vexing, is at least not
omnipresent. Furthermore, due to prison and jail overcrowding as well as
concerns about the fiscal viability of current incarceration rates, states and
counties likely will continue turning to EM as an alternative to
incarceration, whether combined with community confinement programs,
in conjunction with parole or probation supervision, or in the pretrial
context.
However, the substitution/addition distinction demands an increased
awareness of the relationship between EM use and punitive purposes.
When EM is used as an alternative to incarceration, it is de facto punitive.
However, when the same restriction is imposed in the post-sentence
context, some legislatures and courts have tried to distinguish this postsentence use as “merely regulatory.” Yet there is no principled reason
given as to why the meaning of EM is or should be any different in these
contexts. As Part I.B demonstrated, EM satisfies the purposes of
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punishment, and thus can reasonably be favored by reformers seeking to
reduce incarceration rates as an alternative to imprisonment. By contrast,
the use of EM as an added sanction results in disproprortionately excessive
punishment, which is of particular concern given the already severe U.S.
sentencing system.
E. PUNISHMENT THEORY IMPLICATIONS
Both retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment value
proportionality and thus would disfavor the use of EM as an added
condition. The retributivist would be concerned about the use of EM as an
added condition since, provided that EM causes a non-negligible amount of
pain, the addition of EM to an already appropriate punishment would run
afoul of the proportionality requirement. Put simply, if the appropriate
punishment is deemed to be X, adding EM to X will increase the offender’s
punishment beyond its appropriately proportionate level. Similarly, even if
the expressivist might generally favor the use of EM to make an offender’s
conviction and punishment into a “public spectacle,” inasmuch as the
principle of proportionality is built into expressivism187—a notion that the
shame should fit the crime—adding the shaming sanction of EM to a
preexisting proportionate punishment would seem excessive.188
Strictly speaking, the deterrence theorist would not favor use of EM as
an added condition since such use would over-deter criminal conduct.189 If
the appropriate punishment has already been imposed, as calibrated by the
principles of deterrence, then the added condition of EM should be
unnecessary.190 The assertion that society would be safer if all offenders on
probation or parole were subject to EM may be true in a narrow sense, but
would not withstand a cost-benefit analysis. For while society may indeed
be safer if we “incapacitate” more people (whether for suspicious behavior
or criminal history), this logic would result not only in a sharp uptick in
EM use, but also in a continued rise in incarceration, since imprisonment is
187. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive’s Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
89, 113 (2006).
188. While evaluating EM through an expressive lens may be compatible with retributivism,
expressivism also can be framed as reflective of utilitarianism. Heidi M. Hurd, Expressing Doubts
About Expressivism, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405, 429. Instead of being a “scarlet letter,” a utilitarian,
expressive use of EM might stress the rehabilitative potential of EM. For example, the choice might be
made to use a tiny monitoring device that is not visible, thus sending the message that we as a society
want to do whatever possible to aid in the reintegration of ex-offenders. A gap exists in the messagesending potential of EM between when it is imposed as a lifetime sanction and when EM is integrated
into a reentry protocol and understood to be temporary.
189. See Olsen, supra note 108, at 43.
190. This analysis echoes that of retributivism and expressivism.
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undoubtedly more effective as a means of specific deterrence than is EM
use. 191 Further, to the extent that EM caseworkers are already
overburdened, a drastic increase in the number of individuals subject to EM
would exacerbate this problem, resulting in less responsiveness by those
tasked with monitoring the EM devices and decreasing the overall efficacy
of EM use.
Additionally, where EM is imposed as an added condition solely as a
means to punish (that is, as a stick rather than a carrot), EM would not
fulfill rehabilitative goals. An early EM experiment with juveniles in the
1960s used EM as a means of “positive reinforcement” “to monitor the
movements of juvenile offenders [to] encourage them to show up to places
on time.” 192 According to one researcher, “[t]he purpose . . . was to give
rewards to the offenders when they were where they were supposed to be,
that is they were in drug treatment session, or went to school or a job . . . .
And then we would signal them that they were eligible for a reward,”
which might include pizza, a free haircut, or concert tickets.193 He further
explained, “What really changes behavior are motivational factors, such as
fun and adventure and pride and accomplishment, recognition,
affection . . . .” 194 While this example is consistent with rehabilitative
principles, it is entirely distinct from the way EM currently is used in the
adult criminal justice context. Absent are rewards and positive
reinforcement; instead, EM use as an added condition functions as a stick,
and enhanced supervision creates the possibility for more violations that
could lead to incarceration.
III. THE FUTURE OF MASS MONITORING
Part III examines the implications of the foregoing analysis for the
future of mass monitoring. It first addresses the additive uses of EM in the
post-sentence and pretrial contexts, arguing that these uses are predicated
on a faulty understanding of criminal justice EM use as “non-punitive” and

191. Here, analytically, specific deterrence looks a lot like incapacitation, and no one has argued
that EM is more effective at incapacitating individuals than prison or jail. Even incarceration, however,
is not a perfect fix, as many inmates over the years have managed to escape from prison and jail. See
Justin Wm. Moyer, New York Prison Break Just One of 2,000 Per Year, WASH. POST (June 8, 2015),
http://wpo.st/dR0Q2 (reporting 2,001 prison escapes in 2013).
192. Emma Anderson, The Evolution of Electronic Monitoring Devices, NPR, (May 24, 2014,
5:26 AM), https://n.pr/1pgaSoH. See also Kashann Kilson, How the Best Intentions and Spider-Man
Helped Launch Ankle Monitors, INVERSE (Nov. 20, 2015), http://inv.rs/b1o.
193. Anderson, supra note 192.
194. Id. (“Unfortunately, electronic technology has gone to punishment instead of the use of
positive reinforcement.”).
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should be revisited by courts and legislatures. It then identifies key policy
considerations for the future of mass monitoring, concluding that EM as an
added sanction should be presumptively disfavored and that, even where
EM is appropriately characterized as punitive and used as a substitute for
incarceration, policymakers should institute safeguards to promote fairness
and to avoid the unfettered expansion of this technology.
A. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS FOR “NON-PUNITIVE” USES OF ELECTRONIC
MONITORING
This Section scrutinizes the allegedly non-punitive uses of EM in the
post-sentence and pretrial contexts. It finds that these uses are suspect on
constitutional and policy grounds.
First, this Section addresses the constitutional issue. It argues that
some courts have erred in their assessment of EM as non-punitive in the
context of “civil” collateral consequences. 195 If EM use is appropriately
understood as punitive, the retroactive imposition of EM after an offender
has completed his or her sentence should be deemed unconstitutional. Yet
some courts, including the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, have held that EM is
non-punitive and that retroactive “lifetime” imposition of EM does not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Courts are split, as detailed below, and
this Section suggests that the Supreme Court, when it hears a future case on
this issue, should find that because EM is punitive, retroactive imposition
of EM is unconstitutional.
Second, this Section casts doubt on how legislatures and courts have
approached EM in the pretrial context. Where states use EM in addition to
home confinement as a substitute for incarceration in the post-conviction
context, the values of fairness and consistency counsel that the same
sanction should “count” as credit toward time served. As with the postsentence use of EM, there is no consensus among lower courts, and the
Supreme Court has yet to consider this issue.
1. Retroactive Imposition as a “Civil” Collateral Consequence
In light of the history and widespread use of EM as a punitive sanction
and its comportment with punishment theory, claims that the retroactive
imposition of EM is merely regulatory are specious. Yet such claims
195. For a historical perspective on collateral consequences, see Chin, supra note 16, at 1793
(“[T]he systematic loss of legal status, subjecting an individual to numerous collateral consequences,
has historically been treated as criminal punishment.”). See also Margaret Colgate Love, Managing
Collateral Consequences in the Sentencing Process The Revised Sentencing Articles of the Model
Penal Code, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 247, 251–58.
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abound. At the same time that EM is used increasingly by states as a
substitute for incarceration—an indisputably punitive sanction—states have
also imposed EM as a “civil” collateral consequence post-sentence.196 In a
growing number of states, individuals who have completed their sentences
are subject to lifetime EM, 197 and some states have imposed such EM
lifetime sentences retroactively.198
On January 29, 2016, the Seventh Circuit upheld Wisconsin’s
retroactive imposition of lifetime EM over an Ex Post Facto challenge.199
The court’s ruling, reversing the district court, 200 was premised on the
notion that EM is not punitive.201 The court reasoned, “Having to wear the
monitor is a bother, an inconvenience, an annoyance, but no more is
punishment than being stopped by a police officer on the highway and
asked to show your driver’s license is punishment, or being placed on a sex
offender registry . . . .”202 There was no evidence presented to substantiate
this characterization of EM as a mere “annoyance,” nor did the court
grapple with existing empirical data that suggest offenders experience EM
as punitive. 203 The Seventh Circuit opinion also failed to mention the
existing use of EM as a substitute for incarceration—decidedly a punitive
use.
Lower courts are split on this issue, and the Supreme Court has yet to
weigh in. The Seventh Circuit ruling in Belleau v. Wall comports with prior

196. See Chin, supra note 16, at 1799–803; supra note 8 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 948.012(4) (West 2016) (requiring that any person “who is convicted
of a life felony for lewd and lascivious molestation” be subject to EM for the rest of their life, if not
subject to life imprisonment); IND. CODE § 35-50-6-1(f) (West 2016) (requiring that sexually violent
predators on parole who move to Indiana wear a monitoring device); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3717(u)
(2016); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:560.3(A)(3) (2016); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1231 (2016); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 750.520n (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 559.106 (2016) (requiring that “prior sex
offender[s] . . . be electronically monitored . . . [by] a global positioning system or other technology that
identifies and records the offender’s location at all times”).
198. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-303 (2016); WIS. STAT. § 301.48 (2016).
199. Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 937–38 (7th Cir. 2016).
200. Belleau v. Wall, 132 F.Supp.3d 1085 (E.D. Wis. 2015), rev’d, 811 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016).
201. See Belleau, 811 F.3d at 937 (“The monitoring law is not punishment; it is prevention.”).
202. Id. But see Lance J. Rogers, Lifetime GPS Ankle Monitor Is Constitutional, BLOOMBERG
BNA: CRIM. L. REP. (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.bna.com/lifetime-gps-ankle-n57982066905 (discussing
division among courts as to the punitive nature of EM).
203. The court analogized to a posted speed limit, completely ignoring the physical aspects of the
EM device affixed to the wearer’s body 24/7: “[N]o one thinks that a posted speed limit is a form of
punishment. It is a punishment trigger if the police catch you violating the speed limit, but police are
not required to obtain a warrant before stopping a speeding car. The anklet monitor law is the same: it
tells the plaintiff—if you commit another sex offense, you’ll be caught and punished, because we know
exactly where you are at every minute of every day.” Belleau, 811 F.3d at 938.
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decisions by the Sixth Circuit204 and courts in North Carolina205 and South
Carolina206 holding that retroactive imposition of EM could withstand an
Ex Post Facto challenge. By contrast, courts in Massachusetts207 and New
Jersey 208 have ruled that the retroactive imposition of EM is
unconstitutional.
In the absence of Supreme Court precedent on the constitutionality of
retroactive imposition of EM, courts grappling with this issue have relied
on the Court’s handling of the retroactive imposition of a sex offender
registration requirement. In Smith v. Doe, which involved the
constitutionality of Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act,209 the Court
outlined a two-step process to determine whether the statute at issue was
punishment or not. 210 First, the court determines whether the state
legislature intended for the statute to be civil or punitive.211 If the intent
was punitive, then the statute must be struck down as unconstitutional
under the Ex Post Facto Clause.212
If the court determines that the legislature’s intent was nonpunitive, 213 then the court next considers the effect of the statute and,
specifically, whether the statute is so punitive in purpose or effect that the
204. Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1000 (6th Cir. 2007).
205. State v. Bowditch, 700 S E.2d 1, 2 (N.C. 2010).
206. State v. Nation, 759 S.E.2d 428, 432 (S.C. 2014) (upholding “Jessie’s Law” and finding that
GPS monitoring is a “civil requirement,” and “not a punishment”). Notably, this was a 3-2 decision, and
the dissenters argued that the law was unconstitutional because it failed to require an individualized
determination of the defendant’s likelihood of recidivism. Id. at 432–33 (Hearn, J., dissenting).
207. Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 197 (Mass. 2009).
208. Riley v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 98 A.3d 544, 560 (N.J. 2014).
209. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89 (2003) (citing 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 41).
210. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (examining the constitutionality of retroactive imposition of the Alaska
Sex Offender Registration Act, which required all sex offenders to register with the Department of
Public Safety). Notably, this case involved two reversals: the district court ruled against petitioners, id.
at 91, and the appellate court reversed, holding that the Act was punitive, and thus retroactive
imposition violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, id. at 91–92. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate
court’s ruling. Id. at 106.
211. Id. at 92. See also Frank Jaehoon Lee, Note, Severing the Invisible Leash A Challenge to
Tennessee’s Sex Offender Monitoring Act in Doe v. Bredesen, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 683, 688 (2010).
Many have noted the fraught nature of inquiries into legislative intent. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook,
The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 66 (1988).
212. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
213. In Smith, the majority determined that the legislative intent was civil. With no hint of irony,
the majority noted that “[t]he notification provisions of the Act are codified in the State’s ‘Health,
Safety, and Housing Code,’ . . . confirming our conclusion that the statute was intended as a
nonpunitive regulatory measure,” while also maintaining that the fact that the Act’s registration
provisions are codified in the State’s Code of Criminal Procedure is not dispositive, since “[t]he
location and labels of a statutory provision do not by themselves transform a civil remedy into a
criminal one.” Id. at 94.
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statute is in fact properly characterized as punishment. 214 In determining
whether Alaska’s law requiring sex offenders to register with the
Department of Safety could be imposed retroactively, the Supreme Court in
Smith referred to the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez precedent,215 which set
forth a balancing test216 to determine whether the statute’s effect is punitive
or non-punitive for purposes of Ex Post Facto analysis.217 The Smith Court
applied five “Mendoza-Martinez factors,” examining whether the Act at
issue “has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment;
imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims
of punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is
excessive with respect to this purpose.” 218 Over a sharply worded
dissent,219 the majority found that each factor supported the conclusion that
the registration requirement was non-punitive.220 There is, however, reason
to suspect that the Court’s ruling on this issue is inconclusive. The Smith
case was decided 6-3, and those in the majority included Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Souter, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas.
With only two of these Justices remaining on the Supreme Court, the
question whether registration requirements are punitive could be resolved
differently should the Supreme Court hear another similar challenge.
Furthermore, lower courts that have applied the Smith precedent have
diverged considerably. While many have upheld laws that retroactively
require sex offender registration, 221 a 2016 Sixth Circuit opinion
distinguished Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”) from

214. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963) (delineating a seven-factor
test of whether a sanction is punitive); Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 44 (1st Cir. 2009) (applying the
Mendoza-Martinez factors to new laws disenfranchising imprisoned felons); Myrie v. Comm’r, 267
F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors to New Jersey law); Doe v. Lee,
132 F. Supp. 2d 57, 68 (D. Conn. 2001) (applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors to Connecticut’s sex
offender registration act).
215. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97.
216. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168 (enumerating “the tests traditionally applied to determine
whether an Act of Congress is penal or regulatory in character”). See also Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d
929, 943 (7th Cir. 2016) (describing the discretionary nature of balancing tests, which “are neither
exhaustive nor dispositive, they merely supply useful guideposts”).
217. Mendoza-Martiez, 372 U.S. at 164 (considering statutes that retroactively “impose[d]
forfeiture of citizenship” to determine whether they were “essentially penal in character” for purposes
of Ex Post Facto Clause analysis).
218. Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. Additional factors not considered by Smith included “whether the
regulation comes into play only on a finding of scienter and whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime,” which were “of little weight in this case.” Id. at 105.
219. Id. at 114–18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 97–103 (majority opinion).
221. E.g., Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 941 (7th Cir. 2016).
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the Alaska law found to be non-punitive by the Supreme Court in Smith.222
After describing the evolution of SORA from “a non-public registry” to “a
byzantine code governing in minute detail the lives of the state’s sex
offenders,”223 the Sixth Circuit applied the five Mendoza-Martinez factors
and found that the law was punitive in effect.224 The court found that the
SORA restrictions comported with “the general, and widely accepted,
definition of punishment offered by legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart,”225 and
that SORA’s requirements resembled both the punishments of shaming and
parole or probation. 226 The court also focused on “the threat of serious
punishment, including imprisonment” that would accompany a failure to
comply.227 The court was not convinced by Michigan’s argument that since
“these restraints are not physical in nature . . . the actual effects are
therefore ‘minor and indirect.’” 228 The court also observed, “SORA
advances all of the traditional aims of punishment.”229 Notably, as to the
question, “Does it have a rational connection to a non-punitive purpose?”
the court highlighted the “significant doubt cast by empirical studies on the
pronouncement in Smith that ‘[t]he risk of recidivism posed by sex
offenders is frightening and high.’”230 The court also criticized SORA for
its lack of “individualized assessments of proclivities or dangerousness.”231
Finally, analyzing the question, “Is it excessive with respect to this
purpose?” the court chided Michigan for “never analyz[ing] recidivism
rates despite having the data to do so,” concluding that the “punitive
effects” of SORA “far exceed even a generous assessment of their salutary
effects.”232
Courts that confront an Ex Post Facto challenge to retroactive EM
statutes invariably analyze EM by reference to sex offender registration
requirements, among other sanctions,233 and they look to the two-part test
222. Does #1–5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 703 (6th Cir. 2016).
223. Id. at 697.
224. Id. at 701–03.
225. Id. at 701.
226. Id. at 701–03.
227. Id. at 703.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 704.
230. Id. at 704 (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003)).
231. Id. at 705.
232. Id.
233. While sex offenders may be subjected to civil confinement post-sentence, and some may
claim that EM is obviously less restrictive, there is a crucial difference. Sex offenders are not relegated
to civil confinement en masse; rather, each is eligible for an individual assessment. Whatever one
believes about the wisdom of civil confinement, this individualized treatment is a fundamental
difference between the domain of civil commitment and that of the imposition of EM post-sentence on
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outlined in Smith for guidance.234 Legislators are savvy enough to know
that their legislation—whether related to sex offender registration or EM—
will be struck down if they explicitly refer to the punitive intent of a
retroactive statute,235 so they will almost certainly choose not to express
this intent, regardless of their underlying motivations. 236 Consequently,
statutes that impose EM retroactively to post-sentence offenders will likely
survive this first inquiry. 237 Indeed, this inquiry can be understood as
overdetermined since there is always a public safety or rehabilitative
rationale for any collateral consequence. 238 To wit, in a Sixth Circuit
challenge to a Tennessee statute that retroactively imposed EM on sex
offenders who had completed their sentences, the court reasoned that the
legislature’s intent was to ensure public safety and rehabilitate sex
offenders, and that the imposition of EM was intended to be civil and not to
function as a punishment.239
Once having determined that an EM law is not punitive in intent,
courts turn to the question whether that law is punitive in effect. To resolve
this question, courts have grappled with how the EM sanction relates—with
respect to level of restrictiveness—to the sex registration sanction at issue
in Smith. Some courts, as illustrated by the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in
Belleau, have grouped sex registration requirements and EM together in a
broad category of those sanctions that are less restrictive than incarceration,
determining that neither is punitive in effect.240 Other courts have offered a
more fine-grained analysis, concluding that EM, while less restrictive than
incarceration, is more punitive than sex registration requirements, and that
the monitoring law’s adverse effects are so punitive that they negate
whatever civil intent was envisioned by the state legislature. 241 For
example, in Commonwealth v. Cory, a Massachusetts court holding that
EM was punitive in effect found that compared to a yearly registration

all members of a class.
234. See supra note 214.
235. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, “Democratic Despotism” and Constitutional Constraint An
Empirical Analysis of Ex Post Facto Claims in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 439, 506–07
(2004).
236. See, e.g., supra note 213. This is not to suggest that the legislative intent in such cases is
punitive, but rather that we are unlikely to glean useful information from an inquiry into intent.
237. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-303 (2016); WIS. STAT. § 301.48 (2016).
238. Importantly, a rehabilitative justification is both administrative and punitive.
239. Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1004 (6th Cir. 2007).
240. E.g., Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2016).
241. See, e.g., Riley v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 98 A.3d 544, 557 (N.J. 2014) (citing Smith v. Doe,
538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003)); State v. Dykes, 744 S.E.2d 505, 509 (S.C. 2013); Commonwealth v. Cory, 911
N.E.2d 187, 197 (Mass. 2009).
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requirement, “a requirement permanently to attach a GPS device seems
dramatically more intrusive and burdensome.”242 The Massachusetts court
drew a distinction between monitoring and registration, placing monitoring
closer to incarceration than to registration requirements.243 Courts remain
divided, and this debate highlights the centrality of the foundational
question: “What is punitive?”244
When eventually faced with an Ex Post Facto challenge to a
retroactive EM law, the Supreme Court should find, as the Sixth Circuit did
in the context of Michigan’s SORA, that these laws are punitive in effect
under the Mendoza-Martinez balancing test. First, while EM technology is
relatively new, it has from its inception been envisioned and used in
distinctly punitive terms as an alternative to incarceration.245 More broadly,
EM use in this context “bears a striking resemblance to historical forms of
punishment” inasmuch as it is “a catalyst for public ridicule—ridicule
likened to the punishment of public shaming or humiliation,” which are
“well-recognized historical forms of punishment.”246 Second, EM promotes
the traditional aims of punishment, serving retributive, expressive,
deterrent, and rehabilitative ends. 247 Most notably, EM causes pain or
unpleasantness, which is central to the punishment goals of both
retributivism and deterrence.248 Third, while EM certainly has a rational
connection to the non-punitive purpose of protecting public safety, the
sanction of EM is excessive with respect to this purpose. Central to the
excessiveness inquiry is “whether the regulatory means chosen are
reasonable in light of the non-punitive objective.” 249 Judge Keith of the

242. Cory, 911 N.E.2d at 196.
243. See id.
244. This analysis highlights the problematic use of “punishment baselines” by courts facing a
Mendoza-Martinez inquiry. If, as many have argued, U.S. criminal justice policy is overly punitive and
our imposition of collateral consequences post-sentence are particularly harsh, then comparing new
collateral consequences to preexisting post-sentence sanctions will undoubtedly yield the conclusion
that many are comparable or even less severe. This Article joins the call for a large-scale reevaluation
of our system of collateral sanctions. See Thompson, supra note 157, at 260 (noting the American Bar
Association’s call for reevaluating and abolishing some categories of collateral sanctions). In this
instance, judicial intervention may be necessary since legislative rolling back of collateral sanctions
(especially for those classified as violent sex offenders) appears politically infeasible.
245. See supra Part I.A.
246. Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1010 (6th Cir. 2007) (Keith, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See also supra Part I.B.2.
247. See supra Part I.B.
248. See supra Part II.E.
249. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105 (2003). This inquiry recalls the proportionality inquiry
discussed above and the retributivist’s challenge of calibrating punishment to crime. See supra Parts
II.B.1 & II.E.
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Sixth Circuit observed that, even if one assumes that a post-sentence sex
offender registration requirement is reasonable in light of a non-punitive
objective, the additional requirement of 24/7 GPS surveillance demands
further scrutiny.250 He maintained that EM in this context was excessive,
explaining:
[B]ecause of the newly enacted satellite-based monitoring program under
the Surveillance Act, Doe must openly wear a relatively large G.P.S.
monitoring device—making his offender status known not only to those
who choose to inquire (via the World Wide Web), but also to the general
public, namely, those who do not actively seek such information.
Undeniably, because of the visibly worn monitoring device, Doe’s
offender status is now known to his co-workers, fellow worshipers at
church, onlookers at the mall, diners at restaurants, patrons at gas
stations, passengers on planes, trains, or buses, fans at sporting events,
moviegoers at theaters, visitors at museums, sightseers, or any other
person who may be at any conceivable location where Doe rightfully
chooses to go . . . .251

Judge Keith reflected further on the punitive nature of EM and why he
believed it to be excessive:
[A] public sighting of the modern day “scarlet letter”—the relatively
large G.P.S. device—will undoubtedly cause panic, assaults, harassment,
and humiliation. Of course, a state may improve the methods it uses to
promote public safety and prevent sexual offenses, but requiring Doe to
wear a visible device for the purpose of the satellite-based monitoring
program is not a regulatory means that is reasonable with respect to its
non-punitive purpose.252

While the Sixth Circuit denied en banc review of an Ex Post Challenge to
Tennessee’s retroactive EM law, five circuit judges joined Judge Keith’s
dissent from the denial of rehearing,253 further confirming that this issue
remains hotly contested.
In the meantime, courts’ classification of EM as “non-punitive” has
drastic practical implications. More than 800,000 people are currently
subject to sex offender registration requirements. 254 In the absence of
judicial intervention, more states may follow the example set by Tennessee

250. Bredesen, 507 F.3d at 1011 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1012.
253. Doe v. Bredesen, 521 F.3d 680, 680–81 (2008), denying reh’g en banc to 507 F.3d 998.
254. See Registered Sex Offenders in the United States and its Territories Per 100,000
Population, NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD. (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.missingkids.
org/en_US/documents/Sex_Offenders_Map.pdf.
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and Wisconsin and pass retroactive “life sentence” statutes imposing EM
on huge swaths of the post-sentence population. With the increasing use
and availability of EM technology, it is not unrealistic to imagine a steadily
increasing number of individuals subject to years, or a lifetime, of EM after
their sentence is complete. Additionally, under existing jurisprudence, EM
could be imposed post-sentence on new categories of offenders beyond the
sex offender population.
2. Pretrial Release Conditions and Credit for Time Served
The foregoing analysis informs two contested questions in the pretrial
release context: First, how does EM, as a condition of pretrial release,
compare to pretrial detention? Second, should an individual subject to EM
as a condition of bail receive credit for time served? That is, should a
convicted person’s sentence be shortened by the amount of time that person
already spent subject to EM?
If EM in the criminal justice context is a punitive sanction, then it is
error for legislatures and courts to consider pretrial imposition of home
confinement coupled with EM as noncustodial, and for individuals subject
to this pretrial sanction not to be eligible for credit for time served.
Furthermore, the pretrial sanction of EM plus house arrest looks very
similar to the post-conviction context where EM routinely is used as a
substitute for incarceration. Thus, claims that this same sanction is nonpunitive in the pretrial context are dubious.
According to the American Bar Association, in the pretrial context,
preference should be given to the least restrictive sanction that ensures the
defendant will not abscond and promotes public safety. Specifically, “[t]he
law favors the release of defendants pending adjudication of charges.
Deprivation of liberty pending trial is harsh and oppressive, subjects
defendants to economic and psychological hardship, interferes with their
ability to defend themselves, and, in many instances, deprives their families
of support.” 255 “In deciding pretrial release, the judicial officer should
assign the least restrictive condition(s) of release that will reasonably
ensure a defendant’s attendance at court proceedings and protect the
community, victims, witnesses or any other person.”256
At the pretrial stage, the judge has three options. From least to most
255. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE § 10-1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 3d ed.
2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/pretrial_
release.pdf.
256. Id. § 10-1.2.
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restrictive, they are as follows: The least restrictive option, Level 1, is to
release the defendant on personal recognizance. The defendant promises to
appear in court as appropriate, and if the defendant fails to do so, the
defendant will be held in contempt of court.257 No supervision, money bail,
or other conditions are imposed.258 The next level of restrictiveness, Level
2, entails the release of a defendant on a condition or combination of
conditions, which could include a secured bond, EM, travel and curfew
restrictions, and job training or drug treatment programs, among others.259
The most restrictive option, Level 3, is the decision to detain the defendant
without bail.
When analyzing EM use at the pretrial stage, the key question is what
the alternative sanction would be for a particular defendant. 260 The two
most extreme examples are easiest to analyze. If the defendant would
otherwise be released on personal recognizance, then the imposition of EM
is an added condition. If the defendant would otherwise be detained
pretrial, then the imposition of EM is a substitute for pretrial detention. On
the restrictiveness axis, EM use as a substitute for pretrial detention should
be preferred, assuming that there is not a significant risk of flight or a
concern about dangerousness. Furthermore, with respect to cost, use of EM
as a substitute for pretrial detention should appeal to states, counties, and
defendants alike.261 By contrast, if the defendant would have been released
anyway, and EM is merely an added condition, then EM imposes an unduly
restrictive burden on the defendant and an extra cost on both the defendant
and the state. Thus, on both axes of restrictiveness and cost, policymakers
as well as defendants should prefer that, at the pretrial stage, EM be used
only as a substitute, and that credit for time served be granted to those who
are subject to home confinement with EM.
This analysis raises the question: How should policymakers calibrate
the ratio of incarceration to EM use at the pretrial stage?262 One option
257. See Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO.
L.J. 1435, 1454–55 (2009).
258. See AMANDA PETTERUTI & NASTASSIA WALSH, JUSTICE POLICY INST., JAILING
COMMUNITIES: THE IMPACT OF JAIL EXPANSION AND EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SAFETY STRATEGIES 11
(2008), http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/08-04_rep_jailingcommunities_ac.pdf.
259. THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ NO. 214994, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 5 (2007),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf.
260. See supra Part II.D.
261. Wiseman, supra note 13, at 1379–81. But see Eisenberg, supra note 175, at 101–14
(discussing resistance to reform by powerful public- and private-sector industry stakeholders).
262. While this Article asserts a bright line between punitive and non-punitive, it does not attempt
to resolve the question of which EM-to-incarceration ratio is most appropriate, nor does it suggest that
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would be for states to align pretrial ratios with existing post-conviction
ratios. For example, since Rhode Island uses a 2:1 ratio (that is, each day of
post-conviction incarceration can be substituted with two days of EM),263
for consistency’s sake, perhaps Rhode Island should grant one day of time
served per each two days an offender spends pretrial on EM.264 By contrast,
California uses a 1:1 ratio at the post-conviction stage,265 so perhaps the
computation for time served in California should be 1:1 as well. The
existence or lack of other conditions imposed is also significant—home
confinement plus EM resembles the post-conviction community
confinement alternative enough that it should be presumed sufficiently
custodial; 266 however, EM with no other restrictions would not seem
comparably custodial.267
At the pretrial stage, it will not always be clear whether EM is an
added condition or whether, if not for EM, a particular defendant would be
detained. The baseline problem introduced above is particularly acute at the
pretrial stage because Level 2—the release of a defendant on a condition or
combination of conditions, which include a secured bond and EM—is a
vast category. Furthermore, there is unlikely to be a consensus about which
pretrial release conditions are more or less restrictive. This determination
will depend substantially on the defendant’s economic circumstances as
well as other preferences. For example, what of the use of EM when
defendants simply cannot afford bail? At any time, approximately 500,000
people are in jail, subject to pretrial detention. 268 Two-thirds of this
population of pretrial detainees are designated “low bail risk,” which means
that they pose “no significant risk to themselves or the community, as well
as representing a low risk of flight.”269 It seems likely that a significant

this determination should necessarily be the same across jurisdictions.
263. Interview with Anne D’Alessio, supra note 58. Theoretically, any ratio could be justified.
The question of what ratio is appropriate, while worthy of future theoretical and empirical study, is
beyond the scope of this Article and entirely distinct from the determination of whether EM is punitive
or non-punitive.
264. Noting that a 2:1 ratio in this context would be internally consistent should not be construed
as weighing in on the appropriateness of this ratio.
265. Telephone Interview with Kevin O’Connell, supra note 93.
266. See supra Part I.A.2 (documenting the post-conviction use of EM plus house arrest as an
alternative to incarceration).
267. This Article distinguishes between custodial and punitive; it argues that EM use generally is
punitive, and that it should also be considered custodial when coupled with home confinement or a
similar restriction on the offender’s movement.
268. Shima Baradaran, The State of Pretrial Detention, in THE STATE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2011,
at 187, 190 (Myrna Raeder ed., 2011).
269. State Policy Implementation Project, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_
justice/spip.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2017).
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percent of these detainees are only subject to pretrial detention because
they cannot afford bail.270 Arguably, for this population, the imposition of
EM would be a significant improvement over pretrial detention.271 Barring
the first-order solution of calibrating bail for low-risk individuals such that
none are assigned a bail amount that they cannot afford, pretrial release
with the requirement of EM may be a next-best solution—a less restrictive
alternative to detention. This is because, for the low-income defendant,
money bail, even set at a low amount, may be prohibitive, and it may, de
facto, result in pretrial detention.
Where pretrial defendants are subject to EM and house arrest, it must
be noted that this sanction may look strikingly similar to the postconviction context where EM is used as an alternative to incarceration.272
However, courts have routinely treated these two contexts as entirely
different: while EM use post-conviction is understood to serve as a
substitute for incarceration, EM use at the pretrial stage, even when
coupled with home confinement, has been deemed by many courts to be
noncustodial, and thus does not qualify toward credit for time served.
Many state courts have held that, unlike pretrial detention, the pretrial
imposition of EM coupled with home confinement is insufficiently
custodial and therefore does not accrue credit toward an offender’s
sentence.273 Ohio courts have defined confinement as “requir[ing] such a
restraint on the defendant’s freedom of movement that he cannot leave
official custody of his own volition.” 274 But instead of examining
conditions of confinement, the courts have distinguished between
confinement and “official custody,” making it impossible for defendants to
accrue credit for time served unless they are detained. In Indiana, courts
have examined pretrial confinement conditions, ultimately concluding that
home confinement was not “substantially similar” to pretrial detention.275
A Kansas court even refused to find that a defendant who was
270. Wiseman, supra note 13, at 1346 n.2 (“[I]t is likely safe to assume . . . that the low bail
amounts at the state level are typically imposed on non-dangerous defendants, and the statistics for this
low-bond defendant class are compelling.”).
271. Id. at 1380.
272. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Kevin O’Connell, supra note 93.
273. See, e.g., Durkin v. Davis, 538 F.2d 1037, 1039–40 (4th Cir. 1976). Thus far, all courts have
ruled that EM on its own—without home confinement—is not custodial. The more contested issue,
addressed by this Section, is whether home confinement plus EM should be considered custodial and
whether there is a meaningful difference to be drawn between this EM use and the use of EM as a postconviction substitute for incarceration.
274. State v. Blankenship, 949 N.E 2d 1087, 1093 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
275. Roberts v. State, 998 N.E.2d 743, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
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electronically monitored and “‘locked down’ 24 hours a day” experienced
“confinement.”276 Courts in Kentucky have distinguished between “custody
as it relates to escape” and custody as it relates to credit for time served,
holding that home confinement satisfies the first but not the second.277
Federal courts also typically have found that home confinement
coupled with EM as a condition for pretrial release does not qualify for
credit toward time served. The Second Circuit found that while home
confinement with EM was indeed restrictive, it does not meet the
requirements to be considered “official detention” as understood in the Bail
Reform Act.278 The Eastern District of New York has held that time spent
in home confinement does not qualify for time toward a subsequent
sentence.279
A few courts that have yet to consider this issue have hinted that, if
confronted with a question about whether a defendant subject to home
confinement with EM pretrial should be granted credit for time served, they
might depart from existing precedent. For example, while courts in
California and Montana were unwilling to grant defendants credit for time
served when EM was a condition of the defendants’ release on bond, these
courts stressed that the defendants were not also subject to home
confinement during that time, 280 suggesting that the combination of EM
and home confinement might be sufficiently custodial. Ultimately, this
remains an open question for future judicial consideration. In the
meantime, to avoid inconsistency, policymakers should acknowledge that
pretrial EM with home confinement looks virtually identical to postconviction EM use as part of a community confinement program, and they
should introduce legislation that would enable defendants subject to these
pretrial conditions to accrue credit for time served.
B. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Use of EM as an added condition does not offer the benefits of
alleviating prison overcrowding or aggregate cost savings and should be
disfavored. To guard against the imposition of EM as an added condition,

276. State v. Guzman, 112 P.3d 120, 122 (Kan. 2005).
277. Norris v. Commonwealth, No. 2009-CA-001152-MR, 2010 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 369, at
*2 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2010); Buford v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 490, 492 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).
278. See United States v. Edwards, 960 F.2d 278, 283 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying 18 U.S.C.
§ 3585(b), pertaining to credit toward a term of imprisonment for prior custody).
279. Kaiser v. United States, 20 F. Supp. 3d 301, 304 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
280. See State v. Lamere, No. DA 11-0278, 2011 Mont. LEXIS 419, at *4–5 (Mont. Dec. 6,
2011); People v. Anaya, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 47, 50 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
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certain guidelines for decisionmakers should be adopted. An individualized
assessment and justification should be required for any decision to impose
EM where EM appears to be an added condition. For example, postsentence, the decision to impose EM should be regarded as presumptively
improper unless the alternative is civil commitment. And in cases where
post-sentence EM serves as a substitute for civil commitment, there should
be regular, individualized assessment. 281 The decision to impose EM
should be subject to regular review and should never be permanent. Under
no circumstance should there be post-sentence imposition of EM “life
sentences.” If EM is used (ill-advisedly) as an added condition rather than
as a substitute for incarceration, the financial burden of EM always should
lie with the government.
Policymakers should take into account the potential adverse
consequences, even if unintended, of any increase in criminal justice uses
of EM, especially when new populations are targeted. Even where EM is
used chiefly as a substitute for incarceration, policymakers should be
vigilant. A holistic assessment of the costs and benefits—both financial and
non-financial—of EM is indispensable to prevent the overreach of EM and
to avoid the pitfalls of an overextended, underachieving system of mass
monitoring. This Section explores implications for financing mass
monitoring and for gathering data and evaluating the effectiveness of
monitoring programs.
1. Financing Mass Monitoring
The stakeholders with a financial interest in mass monitoring include
governments (national, state, and local), private vendors, and individuals
subject to EM. It is crucial to consider the financial implications of
increased EM use for governments who stand to save considerably by using
EM as a substitute for incarceration, for private vendors whose incentives
favor broad expansion of EM programs, and for monitored individuals who
often are expected to pay their own monitoring costs. Strict oversight of
private vendors and program managers in the EM industry is necessary to
avoid conflicts of interest and to ensure that EM does not become a tool for
financial enrichment of the private sector at the expense of both
government and low-income individuals.

281. While courts and scholars may dispute the appropriate standard of proof for civil
commitment, there is no question that an individual assessment is required. See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis,
Due Process in Civil Commitments, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253, 300–05 (2011).
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States and private vendors have starkly different financial incentives.
EM expansion may prove a cost-saving mechanism for states, but only if
used as a substitute for incarceration and not as an added condition. By
contrast, EM vendors have strong incentives to encourage states to expand
their use of EM technology at every stage of the criminal justice process as
both a substitute and an added condition.
For those private prison companies that are already heavily invested in
EM, it would be financially advantageous to encourage EM use as an
addition rather than as a substitute for incarceration. This is because the
same firm could both incarcerate the offender and provide the EM device at
the pretrial stage and upon the person’s release—perhaps for the rest of that
person’s life. Indeed, private vendors should prefer that every person
eligible for pretrial release is subject to EM, even if they have already
posted bail, and that states broaden requirements for EM use post-sentence.
States should pay heed to the incentives of private vendors and push
back against vendor arguments that EM use should be expanded beyond
use as a substitute for incarceration. One significant hurdle, however, is
that states tend to offset their costs by charging monitored persons for the
cost of their EM devices. Only by changing this funding mechanism can
policymakers begin to realign these incentives.
Requiring monitored individuals to contribute to the cost of EM raises
concerns about the creation of perverse incentives since monitoring is thus
“not only . . . cost effective but income generating as well . . . when
administered by the state.”282 Additionally, this pay structure raises equity
concerns as it, like other fee-based systems in the criminal justice realm,
has an unequal effect on the poor.283 As with money bail in the pretrial
context, indigent defendants may be forced to await trial or complete a
sentence in jail for the sole reason that they are unable to pay the required
fees to support monitoring. By contrast, some jurisdictions allow wealthy

282. Kilgore, supra note 166, at 136. Some have suggested that the strong interest of private
industry in EM may have led to overzealousness about its effectiveness. See, e.g., Alladina, supra note
165, at 129–30.
283. See Leah A. Plunkett, Captive Markets, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 59 (2013). For a general
overview of criminal justice fees incurred by defendants, see Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright,
Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175; Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing
and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 831 (2014). See also Starr,
supra, at 831 (discussing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 663 (1983), which held that “incarcerating
a defendant merely because he was unable to pay amounted to unconstitutional wealth-based
discrimination”).
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defendants to pay for GPS monitoring in order to avoid pretrial
detention.284
These inequities are particularly problematic if individuals subject to
EM use as an addition are made to bear the financial burden of this
sanction. This is not a theoretical concern, but rather a growing practical
reality that must be addressed. In some jurisdictions, EM—in addition to
posting bail—is a routine condition for pretrial release, and accused
individuals are required to pay for their monitoring devices. 285 For
example, “[i]n Richland County, South Carolina, any person ordered to
wear the ankle monitor as a condition of their bail must lease the bracelet
from a private, for-profit company called Offender Management Services
(OMS), which charges the offender $9.25 per day, or about $300 per
month, plus a $179.50 set-up fee.” 286 This arrangement can have dire
consequences for low-income defendants (such as one Richland County
individual who reported “liv[ing] on a monthly $900 disability check”),287
but both private companies and cash-strapped counties stand to gain. One
public defender familiar with this Richland County practice explained that
if an offender cannot or does not pay an EM bill, that individual will be
sent back to jail, describing this system as “a newfangled debtor’s prison.
People are pleading guilty because it’s cheaper to be on probation than it is
to be on electronic monitoring.” 288 South Carolina is not unique in this
regard. In twenty-nine states, offenders are expected to pay a fee for their
monitoring device.289
Changes in contracting and compensation schemes for EM could
drastically shift the incentives of EM providers, and states should take steps
to avoid giving private monitoring vendors an incentive to expand EM.290
284. See, e.g., William Saletan, Get Out of Jail Unfree, SLATE (June 1, 2011, 11:11 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2011/06/get_out_of_jail_unfree.html.
This practice raises concerns about a lack of equality based on socioeconomic status and the
involvement of the private sector in criminal justice. See supra note 283.
285. Markowitz, supra note 179.
286. Id.
287. Id. Indeed, for some low-income defendants, the EM fees and associated costs are
prohibitive. This reality challenges the notion that complying with the requirements of EM merely
requires awareness or conscientiousness on the part of offenders. See, e.g., Button et al., supra note 4, at
432 (“Officers will need to take special care explaining to offenders the importance of remaining up-todate on all fines, fees, and financial obligations.”).
288. Markowitz, supra note 179 (internal quotation marks omitted).
289. Button et al., supra note 4, at 427. Some states have instituted a sliding scale, but others have
failed to address the special problems associated with low-income offenders who may not be able to
afford the cost of their monitoring. Id.
290. For detailed suggestions about changing private-sector incentives to promote rehabilitation,
see Eisenberg, supra note 175, at 124–31 (proposing reforms for contracting and compensation in the
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For example, states could insist that contracts with private providers be tied
to rehabilitative metrics.291 This way, providers would not be compensated
more the longer someone is monitored, and private companies would not
receive extra monetary rewards for distributing faulty monitors that lead to
either longer periods of time subject to EM or incarceration.
2. Measuring Effectiveness
Improved data collection and analysis are crucial to determine the
effectiveness of EM programs. They are also indispensable to the
development of metrics that could be used to encourage public-sector
corrections authorities and private firms to improve outcomes. Studies of
EM’s crime-reduction effects are sparse, and they tend to involve
extremely small samples. 292 Despite their shortcomings, however, pilot
programs in various states have yielded results suggesting that EM, as a
principal component of post-release programs, may contribute to a
reduction in recidivism.293 One study, which involved offenders convicted
of a range of crimes, demonstrated that in the post-release context,
monitored individuals were 94.7 percent less likely to reoffend than others
who remained unmonitored post-incarceration. 294 Another study
specifically observing high-risk sex offenders found that the monitored
group was 38 percent less likely to return to custody than the control group
in a typical parole setting. 295 Notably, these studies did not compare
recidivism rates between the monitored and unmonitored populations after
the group subject to EM was released from surveillance.296 Existing studies
context of private prisons).
291. Id. at 130–31 (analogizing to the health care context where accountable care organizations
are incentivized to improve outcomes and lower costs).
292. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 13, at 1369–70.
293. Rapone, supra note 167, at 145 (discussing a 2011 Pew Center study on postrelease programs
in Michigan, Oregon, and Missouri that incorporate EM, which found a correlation between monitoring
and lowered recidivism rates).
294. Yeh, supra note 164, at 1092 (citing Kathy G. Padgett et al., Under Surveillance An
Empirical Test of the Effectiveness and Consequences of Electronic Monitoring, 5 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL’Y 61 (2006)).
295. Kilgore, supra note 166, at 128 (citing STEPHEN V. GIES ET AL., MONITORING HIGH RISK
SEX OFFENDERS WITH GPS TECHNOLOGY: AN EVALUATION OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPERVISION
PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT (2012)). Similar results were found in Virginia, see Kucharson, supra note
166, at 664–65, and Vermont, see NATHAN LAVERY, VT. LEGISLATIVE JOINT FISCAL OFFICE,
ELECTRONIC MONITORING: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF MONETARY BENEFITS AND COSTS (2014),
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/jfo/issue_briefs_and_memos/Electronic_Monitoring_Issue_Brief.pdf
(analyzing the increased benefits and costs of increasing the use of EM in Vermont); Peter Hirschfeld,
State Eyes Electronic Monitoring as Alternative to Incarceration, VT. PUB. RADIO, (June 17, 2014),
http://digital.vpr.net/post/state-eyes-electronic-monitoring-alternative- incarceration (same).
296. Such comparisons are crucial to an assessment of the crime-reduction effect of EM, and this
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have been criticized on the basis of selection problems (that is, the concern
that “at least one potential criterion for the granting of electronic
monitoring to an offender is her or his risk of recidivism”) and the
differential risk of the sample populations (that is, “the possibility that
electronic monitoring programs are restricted to low-risk populations”).297
Future empirical work could investigate whether expanded monitoring
in fact leads to less incarceration. 298 At a minimum, scholars could use
differential rates of EM expansion as a natural experiment to determine
whether states that enthusiastically embraced EM experienced decreased
incarceration compared with states that adopted it more slowly.299 Ideally,
when states expand their EM programs, they could be encouraged to
perform a randomized control trial in which certain randomized and
representative counties or courthouses are given earlier access to new
monitoring resources.300 Scholars could then compare whether these local
jurisdictions imposed less pretrial detention and shorter sentences than the
comparable control group.
To improve on prior studies, it will be necessary to compare like
populations, to distinguish between uses of EM at different criminal justice
stages, and, to the extent discernible, to denote when EM is used as an
added condition and when it is used as a substitute for incarceration.
Relevant metrics and outcomes will be different depending on the criminal
justice stage. For example, at the bail stage, it will be crucial to measure
how often individuals jump bail and to compare outcomes over the same
time period between those who are subject to EM and those who are not
monitored. At the post-sentence stage, in order to assess EM’s relationship
to recidivism, it will be necessary to compare individuals who have
completed EM with those who have completed their time in prison or jail.
Ultimately, at each criminal justice stage, the most helpful comparison will
be between outcomes of those subject to EM and those not subject to EM

area is ripe for future empirical research.
297. Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, Criminal Recidivism After Prison and Electronic
Monitoring, 121 J. POL. ECON. 28, 30 (2013).
298. Few studies have been conducted despite the explosion of EM use. Early studies examined
data from the 1990s and focused on whether offenders violated EM conditions, whether offenders were
convicted of new offenses, and whether the public supported EM use. Crucially, these studies did not
disaggregate the many uses of EM. See, e.g., Payne & Gainey, supra note 33, at 416–17.
299. See, e.g., Aurélie Ouss, Incentives Structures and Criminal Justice 3 (July 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2685952 (describing the use of a natural
experiment to test effects of cost structures on sentencing).
300. For a classic example of this experimental design in the insurance industry, see Katherine
Baicker et al., OR. HEALTH INS. EXPERIMENT, http://www.nber.org/oregon (last visited Jan. 6, 2017).
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during the period when the sentence is in effect and during the subsequent
period when the individual is no longer subject to criminal sanction. Such
comparisons are the only way to reconcile competing claims about the
crime-reduction effect of EM.
Collecting data on the efficacy of monitoring technology itself also
should be a high priority for empirical research. If EM technology is not
functioning appropriately, it may end up requiring additional resources, it
may jeopardize public safety, and baseless arrest warrants may violate the
rights of individuals who are abiding by their ordered conditions.301
Documented cases of false negatives and false positives have cast
doubt on the reliability of GPS equipment for EM use. Cases involving
undetected incidents of offenders tampering with GPS technology have
raised concerns about public safety.302 There have also been reports of false
alerts, some of which may result in incarceration. 303 According to one
report, “Wisconsin’s GPS tracking system repeatedly fails, registering false
alerts and landing the offenders in jail although they have done nothing
wrong.”304 One offender subject to EM explained, “There are times when

301. An investigation in Massachusetts found that malfunctioning of GPS ankle bracelets has led
to an increased number of arrest warrants because law enforcement experienced a dropped signal. Mike
Beaudet, Ankle Bracelet Breakdown Mass. Losing Track of Criminals, FOX25, (Apr. 23, 2015, 10:29
PM), http://www.myfoxboston.com/story/28886713/ankle-bracelet-breakdown-mass-losing-track-ofcriminals. More than 600 arrest warrants for monitored individuals were issued in one month in a
system that monitors approximately 3,000 people. Id. A Massachusetts Superior Court judge said that
she will no longer order that a defendant or offender be subject to EM until improvements are made to
the system. Id. The judge stated that she was aware of several monitored individuals who were arrested
and held in jail even though they had not violated their parole. Id.
302. See Problems Plague GPS Tracking of WA Offenders, supra note 75. A news release based
on a confidential report by the California Department of Corrections suggested that the public was at
risk due to flaws in the 3M GPS system used by the state. St. John, Tests Found Major Flaws, supra
note 116. California has since switched to another GPS company, though 3M still provides GPS
monitoring to other jurisdictions including the Washington State Department of Corrections. Problems
Plague GPS Tracking of WA Offenders, supra note 75.
303. See, e.g., Koran, supra note 116; Christopher Zoukis, GPS Monitoring System in Los Angeles
Plagued by False Alerts, Ignored Alarms, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Apr. 15, 2014),
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2014/apr/15/gps-monitoring-system-in-los-angeles-plagued-byfalse-alerts-ignored-alarms. Despite documentation to the contrary, a Wisconsin Department of
Corrections spokesperson claimed that false positives were not a problem in her jurisdiction: “We are
not aware of any ‘problems’ with our GPS monitoring system, and have several protocols in place to
ensure that the integrity of our system is maintained.” Koran, supra note 116 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Corrections experts have acknowledged the limitations of EM technology: “The technology,
while improved, is not good at tracking offenders in high-rise buildings, subways, basements or large
commercial structures like shopping malls. To be used best, it needs to be used with a clear view of the
sky, no clouds, wide open spaces . . . . We as people spend 90 percent of our time indoors, so there’s an
immediate problem.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
304. Koran, supra note 116.
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I’m afraid to leave whatever room I’m in, even to go to the
bathroom. . . . I’m afraid an alert will go off and the police will show up at
my door.”305
Given that there are many suppliers of EM technology, improved
recordkeeping and reporting requirements would enable states to make
more informed choices about which vendor to choose and would provide
vendors with an incentive to improve their products to reduce the
likelihood of both false negatives and false positives. At present, reports
about the effectiveness of EM technology are not regularly kept. For
example, in Wisconsin, a Department of Corrections spokesperson
admitted that, despite repeated complaints about false positives, “the
agency does not keep statistics on how many alerts are triggered for GPS
offenders, and does not track how often these result in offenders being
incarcerated.” 306 Such failures to measure the effectiveness of EM
technology are not only irresponsible, but they also run counter to any
desire to improve EM technology.
Another significant impediment to EM outcomes may be the physical
characteristics of the monitoring devices. Remarkably, the size and weight
of EM devices have not changed significantly in years, despite
technological advances that have made it possible to create a device that is
smaller and less obtrusive. 307 This is particularly notable given the
competition among EM providers and the typical trajectory of
technological devices getting increasingly small and lightweight. In fact,
developments in monitoring technology beyond the corrections domain
belie any suggestion that updating the technology is not possible.308 One
defendant observed, “I don’t know who designs these, but I think they
design them to punish the wearer physically as well as mentally. . . . With
today’s technology I feel there is absolutely no reason this be so large,
surely these were engineered by very hateful people intent on inflicting
305. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
306. Mario Koran, State’s GPS Monitoring of Offenders Raises Concerns, CAP TIMES (Mar. 24,
2013),
http://host.madison.com/ct/news/local/crime_and_courts/state-s-gps-monitoring-of-offendersraises-concerns/article_123c78ba-93ed-11e2-bce3-001a4bcf887a.html.
307. Notably, the South Korean government set a goal of developing “the world’s smallest sized
GPS units . . . as a way of minimizing human rights infringements.” Younoh Cho & Byung Bae Kim,
From Voice Verification to GPS Tracking The Development of Electronic Monitoring in South Korea,
in ELECTRONICALLY MONITORED PUNISHMENT: INTERNATIONAL AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 1, at 102, 109 (internal quotation marks omitted).
308. Examples include GPS tracking devices for children and pets. See, e.g., Caroline Maurer, 10
Wearable Safety and GPS Devices for Kids, SAFEWISE REP. (Sept. 16, 2016),
http://www.safewise.com/blog/10-wearable-safety-gps-devices-kids; TRACTIVE, https://tractive.com
(last visited Jan. 6, 2017) (promoting GPS devices for pets).
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further punishment.” 309 Policymakers who favor easing the challenge of
reentry should encourage vendors to improve EM technology, both to
minimize the risk of false positives that may hinder the ability of wearers to
be reliable employees, often through no fault of their own, and to create
less obtrusive EM devices.
CONCLUSION
Founding myths are important but not always enduring. When first
introduced, prisons were considered progressive—a “humane alternative”
to the death penalty; 310 they were designed to foster reflection,
introspection, and rehabilitation. Similarly, when EM was pioneered, it was
considered an enlightened alternative to incarceration, even a way
eventually to eliminate prisons and jails. Yet EM technology is not
inherently rehabilitative, nor is it inherently cost saving or progressive.
The staggering failure of mass incarceration is a sobering reminder
that, whatever the intention of a new penal policy or reform measure, it is
crucial to look closely at the incentives it sets into motion and to guard
against unchecked expansion of the criminal justice system and associated
human and financial costs. The role of criminal justice EM will only
continue to increase as this technology becomes cheaper and more reliable.
The contours of its use, however, remain an open question. This Article’s
sustained analysis of the origins and history of mass monitoring and its
functions is a crucial first step toward clarifying conflicting rhetoric around
EM, revealing existing doctrinal inconsistencies, and charting a path
forward to ensure that EM plays a productive and carefully circumscribed
role in alleviating rather than exacerbating the failings of the criminal
justice system.
***

309. Electronic Ball and Chain (Day 25), supra note 83.
310. Sarah Scott, Race/Ethnicity, Historical Labor Punishments, and the Evolution of Private
Prisons, in COLOR BEHIND BARS: RACISM IN THE U.S. PRISON SYSTEM 93, 100 (Scott Wm. Bowman
ed., 2014) (“The dominant explanation for the birth of the modern prison is that it was embraced as a
more humane alternative to the death penalty, corporal punishment and other sanctions.”).

